G.R. No. L-21336 February 18, 1967
VICENTE MENDOZA, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellees, vs. TIBURCIO DUAVE, defendant and appellant.

FACTS

On May 22, 1958, plaintiffs filed a complaint for forcible entry in the Justice of the Peace Court of Palauig, Zambales, alleging that in June 1957, defendant deprived them of possession of a land through “force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.” Defendant denied the allegations and claimed ownership. The inferior court ruled for plaintiffs. Defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). For failure to file an answer, the CFI declared defendant in default, received plaintiffs’ evidence, and on November 18, 1959, rendered judgment ordering defendant to vacate and pay attorney’s fees. Upon defendant’s motion, the CFI set aside the default order and decision, finding his failure to answer was due to ignorance of procedure as notice was served on him instead of his counsel. The court gave defendant 15 days to file an answer; defendant instead adopted his answer from the inferior court. The case suffered multiple postponements. A hearing set for January 12, 1961, was dismissed for non-appearance of parties, but reinstated upon plaintiffs’ counsel’s explanation. Hearings set for September 12 and October 17, 1961, were postponed upon motions of defendant’s new counsel. When the hearing was reset to November 28, 1961, defendant’s counsel again moved for postponement, claiming he needed to secure documents from his client. The trial court denied this motion, considered the case submitted, and reinstated its November 18, 1959 decision. Defendant moved for reconsideration, which was denied, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

1. Whether the trial court acted arbitrarily in denying defendant’s motion for postponement of the November 28, 1961 hearing.
2. Whether the trial court erred in reinstating its November 18, 1959 default judgment after it had earlier lifted the order of default.

RULING

1. No, the trial court did not arbitrarily deny the motion for postponement. Postponements are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Defendant’s counsel had over two months from his appearance to prepare and did not specify what material documents were needed, failing to comply with the Rules requiring an affidavit showing materiality of evidence and due diligence. Defendant was also careless in assuming the postponement would be granted and failing to attend the hearing. The Court emphasized the summary nature of forcible entry cases and the need to avoid delays.
2. No, the trial court did not err. While the reinstated decision was originally a default judgment, the court had already lifted the default order. However, the reinstatement was a proper expedient to avoid further delay. Except for the default declaration, the decision would have been the same had a new one been rendered, as it was based on the evidence presented. The Court rejected this technical objection.
The orders of the trial court dated November 28, 1962, and January 15, 1963, are affirmed with treble costs against defendant.