G.R. No. L-21022, February 27, 1965
DAVID DELFIN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, ILOILO CITY FISCAL and HON. JESUS S. RODRIGUEZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, respondents.

FACTS

On May 24, 1960, the City Fiscal of Iloilo filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo charging David Delfin, a Sales Supervisor of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Iloilo Branch, with malversation of public funds. The information alleged that on or about April 13, 1959, Delfin, a public accountable officer, received and had custody of P21,122.40, representing the value of 677 booklets of sweepstakes tickets for the December 1958 draws. He was obligated to account for and produce this amount but, when required, accounted for only P1,064.11, leaving a balance of P20,058.29, which he willfully misappropriated for his personal use, to the damage of the PCSO. Delfin pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution presented its evidence, Delfin moved to dismiss the information, but the trial court denied the motion on August 16, 1962, finding that a prima facie case had been established. Delfin then filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction in the Court of Appeals, seeking to compel the trial court to dismiss the case and desist from further proceedings. The Court of Appeals denied the petition on October 31, 1962. Delfin appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Delfin’s motion to dismiss the information for malversation, based on his contention that PCSO employees are not “public officers” and PCSO funds are not “public funds,” thus allegedly negating essential elements of the crime.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ denial of the petition. The Court held that even assuming Delfin’s theory were correct—that PCSO employees are not public officers and its funds are not public funds—the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the information. Grave abuse of discretion requires a capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, which was not present here. The information could still suffice for conviction of a lesser offense, such as estafa, as estafa is considered a cognate offense included in malversation. The Court cited U.S. v. Solis (7 Phil. 195), where a person charged with malversation could be convicted of estafa if the funds were private. Additionally, Delfin had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by appealing a final judgment, making the extraordinary remedies of prohibition and mandamus unavailable. The Court referenced Solidum v. Hernandez (G.R. No. L-16570, February 28, 1963), which similarly held that prohibition is not proper when another sufficient remedy, like appeal, exists. Thus, the petition was denied, and the trial court was allowed to proceed with the case.