G.R. No. L-20574 February 26, 1965
EDGARDO R. HOJILLA, petitioner, vs. HON. SALVADOR L. MARIÑO, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Edgardo R. Hojilla, a first-grade civil service eligible and a member of the Philippine Bar, was appointed Chairman of the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration on March 24, 1953, pursuant to Section 27(a) of Commonwealth Act 613. His appointment contained a proviso that it may be terminated anytime, “without any proceedings,” at the pleasure of the President. The position was later classified by the WAPCO as Hearing Officer II, Range 39. On January 23, 1962, the Commissioner on Immigration served petitioner with a notice, enclosing letters from the Executive Secretary and the Secretary of Justice, advising that his appointment had been terminated effective immediately by the President. Petitioner sought reconsideration, arguing his separation was summary, without cause, charge, or hearing, violating constitutional and civil service safeguards. Upon failure, he filed a petition for quo warranto before the Supreme Court, seeking reinstatement with back salaries.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner’s appointment, terminable at the pleasure of the President under Section 27(a) of Commonwealth Act 613, can be terminated without cause and without due process, notwithstanding his civil service eligibility, the quasi-judicial nature of his position, and the WAPCO classification of his role.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. Petitioner’s appointment, though he was a civil service eligible, was temporary in essence because it was expressly made terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power under Section 27(a) of Commonwealth Act 613. A temporary appointment does not confer a definite tenure and can be terminated at a moment’s notice without the need to show cause, as required for positions in the classified service. His civil service eligibility did not protect him from such termination, as he accepted a temporary appointment and thus could not invoke the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. The quasi-judicial powers of his position did not alter the nature of his appointment. Furthermore, the WAPCO classification did not authorize a change from a temporary to a permanent appointment, as the Reorganization Act and related executive orders did not grant such authority. Therefore, the safeguards under Section 32 of the Civil Service Act of 1959, requiring removal only for cause and after due process, did not apply to him.