G.R. No. L-20565 November 29, 1967
JANUARIO T. SENO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE M. MENDOZA of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and CARLOS A. GO THONG & CO., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, members of the United Seamen’s Union of the Philippines (USUP), were dismissed by respondent Carlos A. Go Thong & Co. pursuant to a closed-shop clause in its collective bargaining agreement with USUP, after the union informed the company that petitioners had ceased to be members in good standing. Petitioners demanded reinstatement and backwages, which was denied. After failed conciliation, they picketed the company’s vessels on November 7, 1962, and on the same day filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). On November 8, 1962, the company filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civil Case No. R-7743) against USUP and petitioners, seeking damages and a preliminary injunction to stop the picketing. Despite petitioners’ opposition on jurisdictional grounds (arguing the case involved a labor dispute and an unfair labor practice charge was already filed with the CIR), respondent Judge Jose M. Mendoza issued a writ of preliminary injunction on the same day. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the complaint (Civil Case No. R-7743) for damages and injunction arising from the picketing, or whether jurisdiction exclusively pertained to the Court of Industrial Relations because the case involved a labor dispute and/or an unfair labor practice.

RULING

The Supreme Court set aside the lower court’s order issuing the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court ruled that while a labor dispute existed (as the dismissal involved tenure of employment), the dismissal itself based on a valid closed-shop agreement did not constitute an unfair labor practice under Republic Act No. 875 . Therefore, the unfair labor practice charge was not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIR. Consequently, the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the complaint for damages and injunction. However, the preliminary injunction issued by the lower court was void because it failed to follow the specific procedural requirements for issuing injunctions in cases arising from labor disputes as mandated by Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 . The lower court could not grant the injunction merely under the Rules of Court but was required to hold a hearing with testimony and make specific findings of fact, which it did not do.