G.R. No. L-20131; October 31, 1962
Maco Stevedoring Corporation, petitioner, vs. Hon. Macapanton Abbas and Nenita Ursal, respondents.

FACTS

In B.W.C. Case No. 2722 before the Regional Office of the Department of Labor, an award was issued on September 13, 1960, ordering Maco Stevedoring Corporation to pay Nenita Ursal the sum of P2,808.00 as death compensation for her husband, Sergio Ursal, who died in a work-related accident, plus a P29.00 fee to the Regional Office. Subsequently, on February 26, 1962, Ursal filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Davao, presided by Judge Macapanton Abbas, for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce this final award, pursuant to Section 52 of Act No. 3428 , as amended.
Maco Stevedoring Corporation objected to the execution. It argued that the award had been effectively nullified because the Hearing Officer of the Regional Labor Office had issued an order dated November 10, 1960, dismissing the entire case. The corporation contended this dismissal withdrew the earlier award. Despite this objection, respondent Judge Abbas granted Ursal’s petition and ordered the issuance of the writ of execution. Maco Stevedoring Corporation then filed the present petition for certiorari to annul this order.

ISSUE

Whether the Hearing Officer’s order of November 10, 1960 dismissed the entire compensation claim and thereby nullified the final award of September 13, 1960, thus rendering the writ of execution issued by the respondent judge improper.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the validity of the writ of execution. The Court meticulously examined the text of the Hearing Officer’s November 10, 1960 order. The order stated that before the case could be heard “for the relief from an order of award,” the corporation’s president filed a petition to withdraw its previous petition (presumably the petition for relief), and thus, “this case is hereby ordered dismissed.”
The legal logic is clear: the phrase “this case” in the dismissal order referred specifically to the pending incident—the corporation’s own petition for relief from the award. It could not logically refer to the underlying compensation claim itself. A final award had already been entered on September 13, 1960, and was no longer the “case” pending before the Hearing Officer. The only matter pending at that point was the corporation’s separate procedural move to seek relief from that final award. By withdrawing that petition, the corporation left the final award intact and undisturbed. Therefore, the award remained valid, final, and executory. The respondent judge correctly granted the writ of execution to enforce it. The petition for certiorari was dismissed for lack of merit.