G.R. No. L-20010; October 30, 1962
FRANCISCO BOIX and JOSE SILVESTRE, petitioners, vs. HON. MELQUIADES G. ILAO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Camarines Norte and MARICHU BATALLA, respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Marichu Batalla, a lumber concessionaire, filed a complaint against petitioners Francisco Boix and Jose Silvestre in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte. She alleged that the defendants constructed a roadblock on a pre-existing road, preventing her trucks from transporting logs from her concession area to San Miguel Bay, causing her daily losses. The trial court initially granted Batalla’s prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, ordering the removal of the obstruction upon her posting of a bond. The defendants filed their answer with a counterclaim, asserting that the road was constructed on land owned by Boix and that Batalla’s concession had other adequate outlets to the bay. They moved to dissolve the injunction, arguing the complaint failed to establish Batalla’s legal right to use the private road.
The respondent judge, in an order dated June 18, 1962, dissolved the preliminary injunction. The court found the road to be private property belonging to the defendants and declared that Batalla had not acquired any right to use it for her logging purposes. The dissolution was conditioned upon the defendants filing a counterbond. Subsequently, on July 7, 1962, Batalla filed an urgent motion for reconsideration, stating she needed to use the road to fulfill a commitment to ship logs by July 18, 1962, to avoid irreparable damage.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of July 13, 1962, which revived the dissolved writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

RULING

Yes, the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court emphasized that the sole purpose of the certiorari proceeding was to review the propriety of the lower court’s order reviving the injunction, not to adjudicate the underlying property rights. The legal logic centers on the inconsistency and arbitrariness of the lower court’s actions. In its June 18 order, the court made a definitive finding that the road was private property of the petitioners and that the respondent had no acquired right to use it. This finding dissolved the very basis for the injunctive relief.
The subsequent July 13 order, which revived the injunction solely on the basis of Batalla’s urgent business need to ship logs, constituted a reversal without any new factual or legal justification that would overturn the earlier finding of no legal right. A preliminary mandatory injunction, which commands the performance of an act, is an extraordinary remedy that should only be issued if the applicant’s right is clear and unmistakable. Having already declared that Batalla possessed no such right, the court could not properly compel the petitioners to allow use of their private property based merely on her commercial convenience. This action was irregular, improper, and a grave abuse of discretion, as it used the coercive power of the court to grant a temporary benefit to a party found to have no legal claim to it. The Supreme Court set aside the July 13 order and made permanent its own preliminary injunction. The Court also warned respondent Batalla against violating its lawful processes.