G.R. No. L-19885 July 31, 1965
PEDRO CRISOLOGO and EURASIA CAPIAO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ALFREDO L. DURAL, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

On November 8, 1951, plaintiffs-appellants Pedro Crisologo and Eufrasia Capiao mortgaged a house and lot in Cauayan, Isabela, to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC, now DBP) to secure a P25,000 loan. Due to non-payment, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold at public auction to DBP. A week before the redemption period expired, appellants sought help from defendant-appellee Alfredo L. Dural to redeem the property. This led to the execution of a Deed of Assignment of Rights of Redemption and a Supplementary Agreement on July 2, 1956, whereby appellants sold their right of redemption to appellee for P3,000. Appellee then purchased the property from DBP, which executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in his favor on August 15, 1956. Appellee took possession and collected monthly rents.
Appellants claimed a prior verbal understanding allowed them to redeem the property from appellee anytime they had money. When appellee refused redemption, appellants filed a complaint for Reconveyance and Damages in the CFI of Isabela. After appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss (which the court deferred), the case proceeded to trial. Plaintiffs presented one witness, Atty. Floro Crisologo, on January 19, 1958. Several hearings were postponed. On June 28, 1961, plaintiffs’ counsel, Atty. Mauro Verzosa, failed to appear, sending a telegram citing poor health. The trial court denied the motion for postponement and dismissed the complaint for insufficient evidence. Appellants filed a verified Motion for Reconsideration with medical certificates, which the court denied, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint solely due to counsel’s failure to appear at the scheduled continuation of the hearing on June 28, 1961.

RULING

Yes, the lower court erred. The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order and remanded the case for further proceedings. Motions for continuance are within the court’s sound discretion, but such discretion must be exercised wisely. Appellants were not neglectful; one plaintiff was present and presented counsel’s telegram. A reasonably justified continuance to allow plaintiffs to present evidence would not materially prejudice the defendant and aligns with fair play and justice. Substantial compliance with the rules was shown, and counsel’s fault was an excusable lapse. Considering the litigation involved approximately P70,000, a witness had already been presented, and the allegations, if substantiated, might warrant relief, dismissal was improper. Procedural technicalities should not obstruct justice, especially when they cease to be an aid to justice.