G.R. No. L-19857 October 26, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DAMASO ATIENZA, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

Defendant-appellee Damaso Atienza was charged with grave oral defamation in the Municipal Court of Cagayan de Oro (Criminal Case No. 6612) upon a sworn complaint signed by the offended party, Pilar Lee. The defamatory words allegedly uttered were: “Pauli na, puta ka. Oo, puta ka puta kat bilaw,” translated in the complaint as: “Go home, you prostitute. Yes, you are a prostitute, really a prostitute.” The complaint also bore the signature of the special counsel acting as public prosecutor below the verification and list of prosecution witnesses. After the defendant’s plea of not guilty, the trial was well advanced, with only the sur-rebuttal witness for the defense remaining, when defense counsel moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction. The objection was that the case was prosecuted upon a complaint signed by the offended party herself instead of upon an information signed by the prosecuting officer. The lower court sustained the motion and dismissed the case on March 30, 1962, citing Article VII, Section 24 of the charter of the City of Cagayan de Oro ( Republic Act No. 521 ), which imposes upon the City Attorney the duty to investigate charges and prepare informations or complaints. The lower court’s theory was that since the offense imputed (prostitution) is a public crime, it could only be prosecuted by information signed by the public prosecutor, and thus the complaint signed by the offended party did not validly initiate the criminal action.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court correctly dismissed the criminal case for grave oral defamation on the jurisdictional ground that it was prosecuted upon a complaint signed by the offended party instead of an information signed by the public prosecutor.

RULING

No. The order of dismissal is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The lower court misapprehended both law and fact. First, the cited charter provision is not restrictive; it imposes a duty on the City Attorney but does not prohibit the victim from filing a complaint. The relevant law is Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires a complaint by the offended party only when the defamation consists of an imputation of a crime that cannot be prosecuted de officio (e.g., adultery, concubinage). The decision in People vs. Martinez does not support the lower court’s conclusion; it only underscores the necessity of a complaint by the offended party for crimes that cannot be prosecuted de officio. The more applicable precedent is Balite vs. People, which holds that the statute does not exclude criminal action for defamation (which can be prosecuted de officio) started by complaint. Second, the lower court misapprehended the facts: (1) the word “puta” does not necessarily connote the crime of prostitution as defined in the Revised Penal Code; and (2) the complaint, while signed by the offended party, was also signed by the special counsel as public prosecuting officer, who retained supervision and control of the case and actively participated in the trial. Furthermore, the technical objection should have been deemed waived given the circumstances and the late stage of the proceedings.