GR L 19855; (October, 1964) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-19855; October 31, 1964
Gregorio Frances, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. Crispulo Nicolas et al., defendants-appellees.
FACTS
The dispute involves Lot No. 1841, a homestead originally granted to Sergio Nicolas. After his death, his heirs, including his widow Nieves Tinio and their children, engaged in transactions concerning the lot. Plaintiffs Gregorio Frances and his wife alleged that from 1943 to 1948, they purchased the rights to the entire lot from various heirs for a total of P13,700. However, in a prior case (G.R. No. L-7747), the Supreme Court nullified these conveyances, ordering the heirs to refund the purchase price to the Frances spouses and the spouses to return possession of the land.
Upon remand for execution, the heirs (except Carlos Nicolas) moved in the lower court, representing the refundable price as only P2,500. The court, in an order dated August 2, 1956, granted this motion, directing the refund of P2,500 and the return of possession. The Frances spouses challenged this order via a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-11249), which was dismissed for lack of merit on October 21, 1956. Subsequently, in 1961, the Frances spouses filed the present complaint, seeking to recover the full P13,700 they claimed to have paid, alleging fraud by the heirs in misrepresenting the refund amount.
ISSUE
Whether the present action to recover the alleged full purchase price of P13,700 is barred by the prior final and executory orders of the lower court (fixing the refund at P2,500) and the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the certiorari petition challenging those orders.
RULING
Yes, the complaint is barred. The legal logic rests on the doctrines of finality of judgment and conclusiveness of judgment (res judicata). The Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-7747 established the heirs’ right to recover the land contingent upon a refund. The lower court’s August 2, 1956, order, which fixed the specific refundable amount at P2,500, constituted a final determination on that particular issue incidental to the execution of the main judgment. The Frances spouses had two avenues to challenge this order: an ordinary appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. They chose the latter, filing G.R. No. L-11249, which the Supreme Court dismissed for lack of merit. This dismissal rendered the lower court’s order final and executory.
Consequently, the issue of the correct refund amount was definitively settled. The present suit, filed years later, constitutes a collateral attack on that final order and an attempt to relitigate the same issue. The law prohibits reopening matters already adjudicated with finality to ensure judicial stability and end litigation. Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint as barred by the prior final judgment. The affirmation of the dismissal underscores that parties cannot indefinitely revive settled questions by repackaging their claims in a new complaint.
