GR L 19820; (September, 1965) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-19820 September 20, 1965
Petra T. Almendra and Tomas Almendra, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. Eleodoro G. Alvero, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
Petra T. Almendra and her husband Tomas Almendra filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against Eleodoro G. Alvero. The complaint alleged that on July 1, 1959, Alvero filed two separate criminal charges against Petra T. Almendra and her niece Loreta Almendra in the Justice of the Peace Court of Abuyog, Leyte: one for altering boundaries and another for malicious mischief. Both criminal cases were dismissed. The complaint further alleged that Alvero was moved by malice because he knew the accusations were false. Additionally, paragraph 3 of the complaint averred that after the warrant of arrest was issued, Alvero personally helped the arresting policeman, publicly shouted that Petra T. Almendra was a criminal who should be jailed, and cursed her while she was being brought to jail. The Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed the complaint for insufficiency to state a cause of action. The plaintiffs appealed.
ISSUE
Whether the complaint for malicious prosecution sufficiently states a cause of action.
RULING
No, the complaint does not sufficiently state a cause of action for malicious prosecution. The determination of a complaint’s sufficiency must be based on its allegations alone. While the complaint avers malice, this is negated by the factual findings stated in the orders of dismissal issued by the Justice of the Peace Court. Those orders found that malice and deliberate intent were lacking. The circumstances known to Alvero—that he owned the fence, that Petra T. Almendra cut its posts and moved the fence to new posts eight meters away—were such as would excite in a reasonable mind the belief that she was guilty of the crimes of malicious mischief and altering boundary marks. This constitutes probable cause, which eliminates the essential element of malice in an action for malicious prosecution. Furthermore, the allegedly slanderous words described in paragraph 3 of the complaint were merely incidental to the claim of malicious prosecution and were not intended to embody a separate cause of action, as no claim for damages specifically from that act was made. The order of dismissal is affirmed.