GR L 19815 16; (May, 1966) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-19815-16 May 19, 1966
Filemon Yepes and Mateo Susaya, plaintiffs and appellees, vs. Samar Express Transit, represented by Pedro Ty Belizar operator, defendant and appellant.
FACTS
On July 23, 1959, plaintiffs-appellees Filemon Yepes and Mateo Susaya boarded a bus operated by defendant-appellant Samar Express Transit. The bus met with an accident, turning turtle and catching fire, which caused serious burns to the appellees. The appellant had them treated at Borongan Emergency Hospital and later, upon the appellees’ request, at Leyte Provincial Hospital, with the appellant paying all related expenses. Before their transfer, the appellees signed a document (Exhibit I) stating that “in consideration of the expenses which said operator has incurred in properly giving us the proper medical treatment, we hereby manifest our desire to waive any and all claims against the operator of the Samar Express Transit.” Despite this document, the appellees filed separate complaints for damages against the appellant for breach of contract of carriage. The appellant defended itself by claiming the accident was due to a fortuitous event or passenger negligence and that the appellees had waived their right to claim damages. The lower court ruled the waiver was null and void as contrary to public policy, awarded damages to the appellees, and ordered payment of attorney’s fees and costs, prompting the appellant’s appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the “waiver” signed by the appellees (Exhibit I) is valid and effective to bar their claim for damages against the appellant.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the waiver was not valid and effective. The Court examined the document (Exhibit I) and found that the appellees merely expressed a “desire” to waive their claims, which is not equivalent to an actual, clear, and unequivocal waiver of their right to claim damages. A waiver of such a right must be clear and unequivocal. Consequently, the Court deemed it unnecessary to address the broader question of whether such a waiver, if actually made, would be contrary to public policy and morals. The appealed decision was affirmed with costs.