G.R. No. 19782 ; January 31, 1964
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, petitioner, vs. HON. HONORIO ROMERO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, and TE SUAT ENG and TAI SHUET YING, respondents.

FACTS

Respondent Te Suat Eng filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration in the Court of First Instance of Davao, seeking to be declared a Philippine citizen and to enjoin her arrest for alleged immigration violations. The lower court granted a preliminary injunction. The Commissioner failed to answer the petition and was declared in default. Consequently, on August 21, 1961, the court rendered a decision declaring Te Suat Eng a citizen and ordering the Commissioner to cancel her alien registration. The Commissioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
On February 1, 1962, the Commissioner, through the Solicitor General, filed a notice of appeal. The lower court, in an order dated February 10, 1962, acknowledged that the appeal had been perfected in due time and directed the elevation of the records to the Supreme Court. However, Te Suat Eng filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that a party declared in default has no right to appeal. The lower court agreed and, on March 19, 1962, issued an order setting aside its February 10 order and striking out the notice of appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court retained jurisdiction to set aside its order giving due course to the appeal after the appeal was deemed perfected.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled that the lower court lost jurisdiction upon the perfection of the appeal and thus acted without authority in issuing the March 19, 1962 order. The legal logic centers on the procedural effect of perfecting an appeal under the Rules of Court. Section 9, Rule 41 provides that once an appeal is perfected, the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case, except for certain ancillary matters not involving the appealed merits.
Here, the appeal was perfected upon the filing and approval of the notice of appeal. As this was a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus, no record on appeal was required under Section 17, Rule 41. Furthermore, as the appellant was the Solicitor General representing a government officer, no appeal bond was necessary under Rule 131, Section 1. Thus, the notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal, a fact expressly recognized by the lower court in its February 10 order. Following established jurisprudence, such as Director of Prisons v. Teodoro Sr., once an appeal is perfected, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction. The subsequent order recalling the appeal was therefore issued without jurisdiction. The propriety of an appeal by a defaulting party was deemed a separate matter for the appellate court to resolve. The petition for mandamus was granted, the March 19 order was set aside, and the respondent judge was ordered to give due course to the appeal.