G.R. No. L-19778; February 26, 1965
CROMWELL COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS UNION (PTUC), petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and CROMWELL COMMERCIAL CO., INC., respondents.

FACTS

This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner union. The Supreme Court’s prior decision, promulgated on September 30, 1964, affirmed the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). The case involved employees who were either discriminatorily dismissed or who went on strike in protest against the company’s unfair labor practice. The Court’s decision ruled that both categories of employees were entitled to reinstatement, except those guilty of violence/misconduct during the strike or who had found subsequent employment elsewhere. However, regarding backwages, the Court held that only discriminatorily dismissed employees were entitled to backpay. Employees who voluntarily struck, even against unfair labor practice, were not entitled to backwages unless, after abandoning the strike and offering to return to work, the employer refused reinstatement or imposed new discriminatory conditions.

ISSUE

1. Whether the CIR and the Supreme Court erred in awarding only half, instead of full, backwages to reinstated employees.
2. Whether the employees who struck in protest against unfair labor practice are entitled to backwages because the company allegedly refused to take them back except under conditions contained in its March 1 order.
3. Whether specific employees (Andrada and Dario) should have been ordered reinstated by the CIR.

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the motion for reconsideration.
1. On the issue of half backwages, the Court held that the petitioner’s contention was raised for the first time in the motion for reconsideration and did not constitute a “plain error” or “clerical error” that the Court could consider at its option under the rules. The Court noted that the salesmen were not entirely justified in their actions (refusing to turn over collections), and awarding half backwages was not unprecedented.
2. On the issue of backwages for voluntary strikers, the Court reiterated the rule from the American Manufacturing Co. case: employees who voluntarily strike, even against unfair labor practice, are not entitled to backpay during the strike. They become entitled to backpay only if they abandon the strike, apply for reinstatement, and the employer either refuses reinstatement or imposes new discriminatory conditions. The Court found that the strikers in this case, by insisting on the company’s observance of the collective bargaining agreement as a condition for returning to work, did not in fact abandon their strike. The company’s alleged March 1 order did not impose new discriminatory conditions of employment but was a “tactical” threat that could not negate the strikers’ right to reinstatement. The Court distinguished the American Manufacturing case, where new conditions (signing a new contract, medical exams) were imposed.
3. On the issue of reinstating Andrada and Dario, the Court deferred to the discretion of the CIR. The Court clarified that its prior decision held that the CIR cannot order reinstatement of those guilty of violence against company property and that the seriousness of misconduct is for the CIR to determine. The Supreme Court will only intervene in case of abuse of discretion. The union failed to prove such abuse. The Court also upheld the CIR’s discretion in not reinstating employees who had found employment elsewhere, as automatic reinstatement would negate the policy-oriented discretion granted by law.
DISSENTING OPINION (J.B.L. Reyes, J., concurred in by Concepcion, J.):
Justice Reyes voted for reconsideration. He argued that the no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement was dependent on the constitution of a grievances committee, which the employer blocked. Therefore, the employer, being the first to breach the contract, could not enforce the no-strike clause. He also believed the American Manufacturing case rule did not apply because the employees were provoked into striking due to the blocked grievance mechanism. He emphasized that the cited case supports granting backpay when strikers offer to return but the employer imposes new conditions. He concluded the laborers were entitled to backpay at least from March 14, 1957.