G.R. No. L-19742; January 31, 1964
LUZON STEVEDORING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Antonio Cordero was employed as a sailor on a barge owned by Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. His duties included safeguarding the barge and its cargo, particularly when the patron was absent. On September 11, 1956, Cordero was left in sole charge of the barge. Two days later, his lifeless body was discovered floating in the Pasig River. A post-mortem examination concluded he died from asphyxia due to submersion. Following the incident, the union president promptly notified the company’s marine department officer and requested financial aid for Cordero’s family, which the company denied. The company later filed a notice of controversion with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. The deceased’s widow filed a formal claim for death benefits on March 5, 1957.
The Workmen’s Compensation Commission awarded compensation to the claimant. The company sought reconsideration, arguing that the death did not arise from employment, that Cordero was negligent, and that the claim was filed beyond the statutory three-month period, thus barred. The Commission affirmed the award, prompting this petition for review.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) whether the claim for compensation was filed within the prescribed period, and (2) whether Cordero’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment, thereby entitling his heirs to compensation benefits.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, ruling in favor of the claimant. On the procedural issue of timeliness, the Court held that the claim was not barred despite being filed more than three months after death. The union president’s immediate notification to the company, coupled with the request for financial aid, constituted substantial compliance with the notice requirement under Section 24 of Act No. 3428 . The company was fully aware of the incident and could not plead surprise, which is the primary rationale behind the statutory filing period. This interpretation aligns with the statutory presumption under Section 44 that a claim falls within the Act and that sufficient notice was given, a provision to be liberally construed in favor of labor.
On the substantive issue, the Court found that Cordero’s death arose out of and in the course of his employment. The Commission correctly characterized his duties as requiring his presence on the barge for extended periods. The act of bathing or swimming to attend to personal hygiene was deemed a necessary and habitual incident of a sailor’s life, especially given the nature of his work environment. Therefore, when Cordero went swimming to bathe—a routine personal need—he was acting within the sphere of his employment. His death during this activity was compensable. The Court rejected the argument of notorious negligence, noting he was a swimmer accustomed to water, and there was no clear evidence his death resulted from negligence rather than an unforeseen accident. The employer’s liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act was thus upheld.