G.R. No. L-19718 January 31, 1966
PASTOR D. AGO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL P. BARCELONA, BENITO MACROHON, VENANCIO CASTAÑEDA and NICETAS HENSON, respondents.

FACTS

In 1955, respondents Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin action in the Manila Court of First Instance to recover a Caterpillar tractor, a Jaeger hoist, and a cargo truck from petitioner Pastor D. Ago. The court ordered seizure of the property, but petitioner filed a counterbond and retained possession. On May 30, 1957, the court rendered judgment for respondents, ordering petitioner to return the machinery or pay P30,000, plus monthly rentals and attorney’s fees. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Pending appeal, petitioner’s surety became bankrupt. On respondents’ motion, the trial court ordered petitioner to file a new counterbond. Upon his failure to do so, it issued a writ of replevin. Petitioner challenged the writ unsuccessfully. On November 10, 1958, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. On January 5, 1959, the sheriff served the writ, took possession of the tractor and hoist, and five days later offered to deliver them to respondents’ representative. Respondents refused acceptance because the tractor and hoist were unserviceable and the truck could not be produced. The sheriff reported on January 22, 1959, that due to respondents’ refusal, there was no recourse but to return the machines to petitioner. Respondents also informed the court on January 23, 1959, that they could not receive the dilapidated machinery. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision on June 30, 1961. On August 25, 1961, a writ of execution for P172,923.87 was issued. Petitioner moved for a stay of execution, arguing a change in the situation of the parties since January 5, 1959, because the seized tractor and hoist were never returned to him, and the truck was a junk. The trial court denied the motion. Petitioner’s properties were levied and sold at auction on March 8, 1963, with respondents as highest bidders. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to annul the trial court’s orders, but it was dismissed. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

1. Whether respondents had a right to reject the machinery and petitioner had a corresponding obligation to take them back.
2. Whether the sheriff actually returned the machinery after respondents refused to take them.
3. Whether execution should have been suspended.

RULING

1. Yes, respondents had a right to reject the machinery, and petitioner had an obligation to take them back. Where judgment is for the articles or their value and they cannot be returned in substantially the same condition, the prevailing party may refuse to take them and instead execute on the judgment for value. This right exists when, asking for delivery pendente lite, the property is found in a substantially depreciated condition. The Court of Appeals found beyond dispute that the tractor and hoist had deteriorated and become unserviceable. This right is assured by the provision that a replevin judgment must be in the alternative and by the requirement that if the property is not delivered to the plaintiff, the officer must return it to the defendant, creating the defendant’s obligation to take them back upon tender by the sheriff.
2. Yes, the sheriff returned the machinery to petitioner. Despite petitioner’s denial based on affidavits presented later, the Court of Appeals made an affirmative finding. Petitioner’s failure to contest respondents’ manifestation made the day after the sheriff’s report, which stated the sheriff returned the machines to petitioner, remained unexplained. His tardy denial when judgment was to be executed fostered conviction that the affidavits were secured merely to frustrate execution. Moreover, it was petitioner’s obligation to accept redelivery after respondents’ rejection, and whether he took them back or not, he was liable for their detention.
3. No, execution should not have been suspended. A court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or quash or stay it, as parties are not allowed to raise new issues after final judgment. This is more compelling when the judgment has been affirmed by an appellate court. Cases cited by petitioner allowing stay of execution refer to circumstances arising subsequent to the remanding of the record from the Supreme Court to the trial court. They cannot be invoked when the supposed change in circumstances took place while the case was pending, as there is no excuse for not bringing the matter to the court’s attention earlier. The supposed change here occurred while the case was pending. Regarding the cargo truck, the Court of Appeals found it was missing and could not be produced, not that it was a junk, and this finding is final.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.