G.R. No. L-19671 July 26, 1966
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff and appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants and appellees.

FACTS

Plaintiff-appellant Pastor B. Tenchavez and defendant-appellee Vicenta F. Escaño both filed motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s decision dated November 29, 1965. Additionally, Russell Leo Moran, whom Vicenta married in the United States, filed a memorandum in intervention. Tenchavez argued that Vicenta’s parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, should not be awarded damages due to contributory negligence for failing to dissuade Vicenta from leaving him, obtaining a foreign divorce, and remarrying. He also sought an increase in the damages awarded to him. Vicenta Escaño argued for recognition of her second marriage to Moran over her first marriage to Tenchavez, claiming it was a better and more publicly recognized union. She also contested the award of moral damages against her, arguing that her actions (refusal of wifely duties, denial of consortium, desertion) did not fall under the legal grounds for moral damages and that such an award improperly added an effect to legal separation. She further raised issues of prescription of the actions and lack of jurisdiction over her person. Intervenor Moran argued that recognizing the Nevada divorce was a more enlightened view and that the Court’s decision impaired Vicenta’s constitutional rights.

ISSUE

1. Whether Mamerto and Mena Escaño are guilty of contributory negligence barring an award for damages.
2. Whether the damages awarded to Tenchavez should be increased.
3. Whether Vicenta’s second marriage to Moran deserves legal recognition over her first marriage to Tenchavez.
4. Whether the Church’s disavowal (papal dispensation) of the Tenchavez-Escaño marriage should be recognized.
5. Whether moral damages were properly awarded against Vicenta for her refusal of consortium, desertion, and obtaining a foreign divorce.
6. Whether the award of moral damages improperly adds an effect to legal separation.
7. Whether the actions for legal separation and quasi-delict have prescribed.
8. Whether the lower court had jurisdiction over the person of Vicenta Escaño.
9. Whether recognition of the Nevada divorce decree contravenes Philippine public policy.
10. Whether the Court’s decision impaired Vicenta’s constitutional liberty of abode and freedom of locomotion.

RULING

1. Contributory Negligence: The Court denied Tenchavez’s novel theory of contributory negligence against Vicenta’s parents. The theory was not raised in the lower court, lacked supporting evidence, and contradicted his previous theory of alienation of affections.
2. Increase in Damages: The prayer to increase damages was denied, as all factors and circumstances had been duly considered in the main decision.
3. Recognition of Second Marriage: The Court rejected Vicenta’s proposition that her second, “better” marriage should be recognized over the first. This was deemed a dangerous proposition that would legalize continuing polygamy and reduce marriage to a matter of private contract.
4. Church’s Disavowal: The claim of papal dispensation was not considered because it was not sufficiently established; no documentary evidence was submitted, and Vicenta’s belated appeal to Canon law after seeking civil annulment and obtaining a divorce was unconvincing.
5. Award of Moral Damages: The award of moral damages against Vicenta was upheld. Her acts constituted a wilful infliction of injury upon Tenchavez’s feelings in a manner “contrary to morals, good customs or public policy” under Article 21 of the Civil Code, for which Article 2219(10) authorizes moral damages. The cited cases (Ventanilla and Malonzo) were not applicable.
6. Effect on Legal Separation: The Court clarified that the damages were awarded for her wrongful acts under Article 2176 (quasi-delict), not as an additional effect of legal separation.
7. Prescription of Actions: The Court found that the issue of prescription was not properly raised or argued in the briefs and was therefore deemed waived.
8. Jurisdiction over Person: The Court ruled that the issue of jurisdiction over Vicenta’s person was not properly brought for resolution, as it was not raised in her brief as appellee. Furthermore, by filing a counterclaim, she submitted to the court’s jurisdiction. The rule is that a defendant who files a counterclaim is deemed to have waived the objection to jurisdiction over his person. Her inconsistent positions (challenging jurisdiction while seeking affirmative relief) and failure to raise the issue on appeal confirmed the waiver.
9. Nevada Divorce Decree: Recognition of the foreign divorce was denied as it contravenes the settled public policy of the Philippines. Foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if they oppose the public policy of the forum.
10. Constitutional Rights: The decision did not impair Vicenta’s constitutional liberty of abode and freedom of locomotion, as she had exercised these rights, even abusing them by stating she was “single” on her passport application. The right to seek a divorce abroad is distinct from the recognition accorded to such a decree.
DISPOSITIVE: The motions for reconsideration were denied.