G.R. No. L-19243; February 29, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BUENAVENTURA MARIANO Y TABAQUIN, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Defendant Buenaventura Mariano y Tabaquin was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with illegally engaging in the business of carrying letters or packages for a fee without the required authority, in violation of postal laws. After pleading not guilty, the case underwent several postponements upon the defendant’s motions. The trial was eventually scheduled for June 7, 1961. However, just four days prior, the defendant filed a motion for the appointment of assessors to aid in the trial.
The lower court denied this motion on two grounds. First, it ruled that the appointment of assessors under the applicable laws was discretionary with the court, and it chose to exercise that discretion adversely to the accused. Second, the court found that the motion was filed with a dilatory purpose, noting a pattern of delay by the defense since the case’s filing in August 1960, including multiple requests for postponement and a late-filed motion to quash. The defendant appealed this denial order directly.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court committed a reversible error in denying the defendant’s motion for the appointment of assessors.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order. Initially, the Court noted that the proper remedy against such an interlocutory order was a writ of certiorari, not a direct appeal. Nevertheless, it addressed the substantive issue to provide finality.
On the merits, the Court clarified the governing legal principle. Citing Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 49 of the Charter of Manila, and reaffirming its jurisprudence in Berbari v. Concepcion and Primicias v. Ocampo, the Court held that the right to assessors in criminal cases in Manila is substantial. While a party may discretionarily choose to invoke this right, once a proper and timely motion is filed, the appointment of assessors becomes mandatory for the court; the trial judge has no discretion to deny it.
However, the Court emphasized that this mandatory character presupposes a request made at the earliest convenient time. The right cannot be exercised to hinder or delay the trial. In this case, the defendant’s conduct demonstrated a dilatory intent. He waited over eight months after his arraignment and through several granted postponements before requesting assessors. Furthermore, the factual issues in the case were straightforward, not heavily dependent on witness credibility where assessors’ aid is most valuable. Therefore, under these specific circumstances, the trial court’s denial of the belated motion did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The order was upheld.