G.R. No. L-18943; May 31, 1963
RAMON YAP, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FORTUNATA TINGIN, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

This case originated from an action for partition of a lot and house in Guagua, Pampanga, co-owned by Ramon Yap (5/6 share) and Fortunata Tingin, et al. (1/6 share). The trial court, finding physical division impracticable, rendered a decision on March 18, 1957. It fixed the property’s price and granted defendants a 5-day period from notice to repurchase plaintiff’s share by depositing the price with the clerk of court. Should defendants fail, plaintiff was given a similar subsequent period to purchase defendants’ share. On March 23, 1957, plaintiff moved for reimbursement of commissioners’ fees, which he had advanced (P525 for his 5/6 share, while defendants paid P105). The court set the motion for hearing.
On June 1, 1957, plaintiff filed a manifestation, stating defendants failed to make the required deposit within their granted period and that he had subsequently deposited the amount to purchase defendants’ share on April 6, 1957. He prayed for an order declaring defendants’ repurchase right forfeited. However, on November 19, 1957, the court amended its original decision to include the reimbursement of commissioners’ fees in the repurchase price. It then came to light that defendants claimed to have deposited the required sum with Clerk of Court Amadeo Yuson on March 28, 1957, receiving a temporary receipt, with an official receipt issued later on April 8, 1957.

ISSUE

Whether the defendants’ deposit with the clerk of court was made within the period granted by the court, thereby validly exercising their right to repurchase.

RULING

Yes, the defendants validly complied with the court’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling, holding that defendants substantially complied with the directive to deposit the purchase price with the clerk of court within the granted period. The issuance of a temporary receipt by Clerk of Court Yuson on March 28, 1957, followed by an official receipt on April 8, 1957, constituted a valid deposit. The Court rejected plaintiff’s technical argument that the deposit was invalid because the regular cash officer was allegedly present. It found no evidence that the clerk’s receipt was antedated or forged, and it was logical to assume the clerk would not have accepted the money had the cash officer been available at that precise moment.
Crucially, the Court ruled that plaintiff’s own motion of March 23, 1957, which sought reimbursement not included in the original decision, operated as a motion for reconsideration and amendment. This motion suspended the finality of the March 18 decision. Therefore, when the defendants made their deposit—whether deemed made on March 28 or April 8, 1957—the period for compliance had not yet lapsed, as the judgment was not final until the court resolved plaintiff’s pending motion on November 19, 1957. Consequently, defendants’ right to repurchase was properly exercised, and the amended decision ordering them to pay the additional commissioners’ fees was correct. The appeal was dismissed.