G.R. No. L-18919 December 29, 1962
Abelardo Javellana, Tomas Jonco, Rudico Habana, Exequiel Golez, Alfredo Ang, and Filipinas Soledad, in their capacities as Councilors of the Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, petitioners-appellees, vs. Susano Tayo, as Mayor of the Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, respondent-appellant.

FACTS

The petitioners, constituting a majority of the elected municipal councilors of Buenavista, Iloilo, held regular sessions on specified dates in 1960 as authorized by a prior council resolution approved by respondent Mayor Susano Tayo. During these sessions, the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, two other councilors, and the council secretary were absent. The attending councilors, having a quorum, elected from among themselves a temporary presiding officer and a temporary secretary and proceeded to conduct official business.
Respondent Mayor refused to recognize the validity of these sessions, declaring them null and void due to his absence. Consequently, he declined to act upon the resolutions passed or to sign the payrolls for the councilors’ per diems for those session days. The petitioners sought and obtained opinions from the Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Board of Iloilo, both upholding the legality of the sessions. Despite these opinions, the Mayor persisted in his refusal, prompting the councilors to file a mandamus action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether a municipal council can validly hold a regular session and transact official business in the absence of the municipal mayor, provided a quorum of councilors is present.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, ruling that the sessions were valid and legal. The Court clarified that while Section 2194 of the Revised Administrative Code designates the mayor as the presiding officer of the council, his presence is not a prerequisite for a valid session. The legal logic hinges on the distinction between the power to preside and the capacity to constitute a quorum for conducting business. A quorum is determined by a majority of the council members elected, not by the presence of the presiding officer.
The Court emphasized that to rule otherwise would grant the mayor a veto power over the council’s very ability to convene, which is not sanctioned by law. Such an interpretation would allow a recalcitrant mayor to paralyze the legislative functions of the council for political reasons, thereby undermining public welfare. The law provides for succession in case of the mayor’s temporary incapacity, but this pertains to the exercise of executive powers, not to the council’s inherent legislative capacity to meet when a quorum exists. The award of moral damages to one councilor was also upheld under Article 27 of the Civil Code, as the Mayor’s refusal to perform his duty was without just cause.