G.R. No. L-18884; May 29, 1963
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., represented by its Managing Partner, Gregorio Araneta, Inc., plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANNY VIBAT, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Plaintiff J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., filed an ejectment suit against defendant Danny Vibat in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, alleging Vibat unlawfully entered and occupied a portion of its registered land in Quezon City. The complaint sought Vibat’s ejectment and payment of monthly rentals. Summons was served on April 13, 1959, upon a person named Candido Calon at Vibat’s address. Due to Vibat’s failure to file an answer, the court declared him in default on May 16, 1959, and subsequently rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on June 3, 1959.
On June 23, 1959, Vibat filed a petition for relief from judgment. He alleged that his failure to answer was not due to his fault or negligence. He claimed Candido Calon was merely a visitor and not a resident authorized to receive summons, and that Vibat and his family were in Laguna when service was effected. He stated he only received the summons from Calon several days after returning on May 10, 1959, and learned of the default order on June 5. He asserted a meritorious defense, claiming he purchased the land from one Eustaquio Alquiros.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly denied the petition for relief from judgment.

RULING

Yes, the denial was correct. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order, finding no error. The legal logic rests on two grounds: lack of due diligence and absence of a meritorious defense. First, on diligence, even assuming the service of summons upon Calon was improper, Vibat admitted receiving the summons documents from Calon several days after May 10, 1959. The Court held that had Vibat acted with due diligence upon receipt, he could have discovered the May 16 default order and moved to set it aside well before the judgment on the merits was rendered on June 3, 1959. His inaction constituted negligence.
Second, on the merits of his alleged defense, the Court ruled it was insufficient. Vibat’s claim of purchase from a previous occupant could not prevail against the plaintiff’s Torrens Certificate of Title. Under the Land Registration Act ( Act No. 496 ), a Torrens title is conclusive and indefeasible. Title by adverse possession cannot be acquired against a registered owner. Consequently, Vibat’s purported defense was legally untenable. His proper recourse, if any, was an action for warranty against eviction against his own vendor, not a defense against the registered owner. The petition for relief was thus properly denied for failing to meet the substantive requirements of Rule 38.