GR L 18738; (June, 1962) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-18738; June 29, 1962
CLAUDIO A. PRIMO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. FIDEL FERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch I, FRANCISCO ASTILLA JR., and THE SHERIF OF SAMAR, respondents.
FACTS
On May 17, 1955, in Civil Case No. 4403, the parties entered into a compromise agreement whereby defendant Claudio A. Primo bound himself to pay various amounts to plaintiff Francisco Astilla Jr. The court rendered a decision on the same day approving the compromise. On May 9, 1961, Astilla moved for the issuance of a writ of execution for the unpaid balance of P1,500 plus attorney’s fees. The court granted the motion and issued the writ on July 25, 1961.
Primo moved for reconsideration, arguing that more than five years had elapsed since the May 17, 1955 judgment, thus execution by motion was barred under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The court denied his motion. Primo then filed this petition for certiorari, and the Supreme Court issued a preliminary injunction to restrain the execution.
ISSUE
Whether a writ of execution may be validly issued by motion more than five years after the entry of a judgment based on a compromise agreement.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court granted the petition and made the preliminary injunction permanent. The legal logic is anchored on the clear and mandatory language of Section 6, Rule 39. The rule provides that a judgment may be enforced by motion within five years from its entry. After the lapse of this five-year period, it can no longer be enforced by a mere motion in the same case; the prevailing party must instead file an ordinary civil action to revive the judgment.
The Court rejected the respondent’s defense that the five-year period should be counted from the date the specific unpaid installment became due and demandable (allegedly May 1957). The ruling is unequivocal: the five-year period for execution by motion is counted from the date of the entry of the judgment itself, which was May 17, 1955, not from any subsequent date when an obligation under it matures. Since the motion for execution was filed in May 1961, more than five years after the 1955 judgment, it was filed out of time. The claim, while not necessarily barred by prescription, ceased to be enforceable by a mere motion. The remedy left to the judgment creditor was to file an independent action for its enforcement.