G.R. No. L-18692; January 31, 1963
MANUEL B. RUIZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Manuel B. Ruiz filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila. He sought two primary reliefs: first, to enjoin J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and the Quezon City Sheriff from executing a writ of ejectment and demolition against him concerning a parcel of land in Quezon City; and second, to compel J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. to execute a final deed of sale for that land in his favor upon payment of the balance. Ruiz claimed ownership through a series of transfers originating from a sale by defendant Florencio Deudor to Jose Dinglasan. His claim was anchored on a Compromise Agreement approved in prior litigation (Civil Case No. Q-135, etc.), which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Evangelista v. Deudor, established a contractual relation between J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and Deudor’s buyers, including Dinglasan’s successor-in-interest.
Defendant Florencio Deudor filed a motion to dismiss, one ground being improper venue. Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion for a bill of particulars. Without resolving the motion for a bill of particulars and despite Ruiz’s opposition, the trial court issued an order dated March 11, 1961, dismissing the case solely on the ground of improper venue. The court ruled that since the action affected title to or recovery of real property situated in Quezon City, it must be filed there.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance of Manila correctly dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper venue.

RULING

Yes, the dismissal was correct. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order. The legal logic hinges on the nature of the action as determined by the essential relief sought. Ruiz’s primary and ultimate objective, as gleaned from his prayer, was to secure a deed of conveyance for the land from J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. For the court to grant such relief, it would first have to adjudicate and establish Ruiz’s ownership or rightful claim to the property. This core determination inherently involves title to and recovery of the real property itself.
Consequently, the action is classified as a real action. Under Section 3, Rule 5 of the then Rules of Court (now Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules), actions affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof is situated. The subject land is indisputably located in Quezon City, not Manila. The ancillary prayer for injunction to stop the ejectment, which also necessitates a preliminary determination of possessory rights, does not alter the real and immovable character of the principal action. Venue remains fixed by the location of the property. Therefore, filing the suit in Manila constituted improper venue, warranting dismissal.