G.R. No. L-18565; November 30, 1962
CHINESE COMMERCIAL PROPERTY COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESPERANZA P. MARTINEZ, ET AL., defendants, GLICERIO JOCO and ESPERANZA P. MARTINEZ, respondents-appellants.

FACTS

Plaintiff Chinese Commercial Property Company filed an ejectment suit against defendants Esperanza Martinez and Glicerio Joco in the Municipal Court of Naga City. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, ordering defendants to vacate the premises (Door No. 6 of a building) and pay accrued and future rentals. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) and posted a supersedeas bond. The CFI, however, issued an order for immediate execution of the municipal court’s judgment, citing defendants’ failure to deposit monthly rentals during the appeal. An alias writ of execution was subsequently issued.
The sheriff’s return stated that he commanded the defendants to vacate the property and pay the accrued rentals, but they refused to comply. Based on this return, the plaintiff moved to have the defendants declared in contempt of court. The CFI found defendants guilty of indirect contempt under Section 3(b), Rule 64 of the Rules of Court for disobedience of a lawful writ, sentencing each to one month imprisonment. Defendants appealed this contempt order.

ISSUE

Whether the defendants-appellants were correctly found guilty of indirect contempt under Section 3(b), Rule 64 of the Rules of Court for their refusal to vacate the property pursuant to a writ of execution.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the CFI’s order and acquitted the appellants of contempt. The legal logic hinges on the proper classification of the judgment and the corresponding rule for its execution. The judgment in question was one for the delivery of real property (restitution of possession). The Court, citing the controlling precedent of Goyena de Quizon v. Philippine National Bank, ruled that such a judgment is not a “special judgment” enforceable under Section 9, Rule 39.
Instead, a judgment for the delivery of real property must be executed strictly in accordance with paragraph (d), Section 8, Rule 39, which designates the sheriff as the officer solely responsible for physically ousting the defendant and placing the plaintiff in possession. The defendant’s duty is merely to yield possession; the affirmative act of ejectment rests with the sheriff, who may even employ public force if necessary. Therefore, a defendant’s mere refusal to voluntarily vacate does not constitute disobedience to a writ under Section 3(b), Rule 64. Any contempt proceeding arising from obstructing such an execution must be based on paragraph (h), Section 3, Rule 64, which pertains to resistance or disobedience to a lawful order of a court or judge committed by a person entrusted with the execution of a judicial writ or process. Since the appellants were not the persons entrusted with the writ’s execution (the sheriff was), their conviction under paragraph (b) was legally erroneous. The failure of execution lay with the sheriff’s inability to perform his duty, not with the appellants’ disobedience to a command directed at them personally.