G.R. No. L-18562; July 31, 1961
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondent.

FACTS

The petitioners, Tomas S. Fonacier and Leopoldo Y. Yabes, served as the editor and managing editor, respectively, of the “Philippine Social Sciences and Humanities Review,” a scholarly publication of the University of the Philippines. In July 1959, the Review published a Golden Jubilee issue containing an article titled “The Peasant War in the Philippines A Study of the Causes of Social Unrest in the Philippines An Analysis of the Philippine Political Economy.” The circulation was limited to 2,000 copies, distributed primarily to the university community, alumni, and correspondent academic institutions abroad, not to the general public.
Subsequently, a verified complaint was filed with the respondent City Fiscal of Quezon City, charging Fonacier and Yabes with incitement to sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code in connection with the article. After a preliminary investigation, the petitioners alleged that the City Fiscal threatened to file a criminal information against them. They sought to restrain this prosecution, arguing it constituted harassment, a grave abuse of discretion, and a direct infringement upon the academic freedom guaranteed by the Constitution, which would cause incalculable harm to the university’s academic and research functions.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court should issue a writ of prohibition or injunction to restrain the City Fiscal from filing a criminal information for incitement to sedition against the petitioners based on the publication of the scholarly article.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition. The legal logic is anchored on the well-established principle that, as a general rule, courts cannot issue injunctions or writs of prohibition to restrain a criminal prosecution. This is because it is the sworn duty of a fiscal, upon receiving a complaint, to conduct an investigation and file an information if the evidence, in their opinion, sufficiently establishes probable guilt. The Court recognized only an extreme exception to this rule: when such judicial intervention is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the oppressive or vindictive use of the law’s strong arm.
Applying this rule to the facts, the Court held that the petitioners’ allegations did not justify the exceptional remedy sought. The mere act of the fiscal proceeding with the filing of an information, based on their evaluation of the evidence gathered during the preliminary investigation, could not be presumed to be oppressive, vindictive, or an abuse of discretion. On the contrary, the law presumes that official duty has been regularly performed. The Court found no clear basis to conclude that the threatened prosecution fell within the narrow exception, as the fiscal was merely performing a discretionary duty within his jurisdiction. The protection of academic freedom, while invoked, did not automatically shield the petitioners from potential criminal liability if the facts alleged could constitute a crime; such a defense is properly addressed in the criminal proceedings themselves, not through a preemptive writ.