GR L 18527; (June, 1963) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-18527; June 29, 1963
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. HON. PATRICIO C. CENIZA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental and TEODORO DUMALAGAN, respondents.
FACTS
Respondent Teodoro Dumalagan filed an application for land registration covering over 78 hectares. The Director of Lands, as oppositor, claimed the land was part of the public domain. After the applicant presented his evidence, the counsel for the Director of Lands orally moved to dismiss the application on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Counsel did not make a reservation to present evidence should the motion be denied. The respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated March 23, 1961, and considered the case submitted for decision based solely on the applicant’s evidence.
The Director of Lands moved for reconsideration, arguing that the absence of a reservation did not constitute a waiver of his right to present evidence. The court denied this motion on May 17, 1961. The petitioner then filed this special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the judge in depriving him of the right to be heard and to present evidence for the government.
ISSUE
Did the respondent judge commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss and, without allowing the oppositor to present evidence, considering the case submitted for decision?
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the challenged orders, and directed the trial court to proceed with the trial. The legal logic is anchored on the fundamental right to due process and the procedural rules governing a demurrer to evidence. At the time, the governing rule, which was a clarification of prior doctrines and later embodied in Section 1, Rule 35 of the Revised Rules of Court, provided that a defendant may move for dismissal after the plaintiff’s evidence without waiving the right to present evidence if the motion is not granted. The Court held it was evident that after denying the motion to dismiss (the demurrer), the trial court should have permitted the petitioner, as oppositor, to present his evidence. This obligation exists notwithstanding counsel’s failure to make an express reservation, as such a reservation is implicit in the motion itself to safeguard the movant’s right. The denial of this opportunity constituted a denial of due process, especially significant here where the government’s title to a substantial parcel of land was at stake. The preliminary injunction was made permanent.