GR L 18510; (January, 1964) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-18510; January 31, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ALBERTO M. SABBUN, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
On January 19, 1959, an information was filed accusing Alberto M. Sabbun of violating Republic Act No. 145 by soliciting and receiving excessive fees for assisting spouses in prosecuting their veteran’s benefit claims. The information detailed specific collections: P600 in December 1949; P1,480 deducted from monthly pensions from January 1950 to February 1956; and P170 deducted from March 1956 to September 1957, totaling P2,210 beyond the authorized fee.
The accused moved to quash the information, arguing prescription and duplicity of offense. The trial court sustained the motion in part, quashing the information with respect to collections made four years prior to January 19, 1959, but denied it for collections within that four-year period. The prosecution appealed, contending the offense was continuing and prescription began only from its discovery in September 1957, or alternatively, that an eight-year prescriptive period applied.
ISSUE
Whether the offense charged is a single continuing offense such that the prescriptive period should run from the last act of collection, thereby preventing the prescription of the earlier collections.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order, holding the offense to be a continuing one. The legal logic is that the various collections, though occurring on different dates from 1949 to 1957, constituted a single criminal offense. These acts were integral parts of a singular criminal design to collect fees exceeding the statutory limit for services rendered in connection with a single claim. They were impelled by the same criminal motive and impulse, forming a continuous course of conduct.
Consequently, the prescriptive period for the entire offense commenced from the last act of collection in September 1957. Since the information was filed in January 1959, well within any applicable prescriptive period, the offense had not prescribed. The Court emphasized that the offense could not be divided into separate acts each with independent prescription. The case was remanded for trial.