G.R. No. L-18457; June 30, 1962
GUILLERMO VIACRUCIS and LUISA DE VIACRUCIS, petitioners, vs. HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, ANASTACIO ORAIS and CELESTINA MALAZARTE, respondents.

FACTS

The respondents, Anastacio Orais and Celestina Malazarte, filed a complaint for recovery of possession against the petitioners, Guillermo and Luisa Viacrucis. The petitioners, as defendants, moved for an extension to file their answer until they received a copy of a deed of sale (Annex “A”) referenced in but not attached to the complaint. The court granted the motion, ordering them to file their answer within ten days from receipt of the document. The court’s order and the document were sent by registered mail. The postmaster’s certificate showed that the first notice for the registered letter was sent to the petitioners’ counsel on January 24, 1961. However, the counsel only claimed actual receipt on February 6, 1961.
On January 31, 1961, upon motion of the respondents’ counsel, the trial court issued an order declaring the petitioners in default for failure to file their answer. The court then proceeded to hear the respondents’ evidence ex parte on February 13, 1961, and rendered a decision in their favor on February 15, 1961. The petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim on February 14, 1961, and upon receiving notice of the default order, filed a motion for reconsideration. They argued that their ten-day period to answer only began upon actual receipt on February 6, making their February 14 filing timely. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that under the Rules, service was deemed complete five days after the first notice (January 29), making the petitioners in default by February 9.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring the petitioners in default and proceeding with the ex parte hearing and judgment.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, annulled the orders and decision, and remanded the case. The legal logic centers on the prematurity and nullity of the default declaration. Under Section 8 of Rule 27 (now Section 10, Rule 13) of the Rules of Court, service by registered mail is deemed complete upon the expiration of five days after the first notice by the postmaster. Here, the first notice was issued on January 24, 1961, making service complete on January 29. The petitioners’ ten-day period to answer thus expired on February 8. The court’s order declaring them in default was issued on January 31, 1961—eight days before their extended period to answer had lapsed. This premature declaration was issued without jurisdiction, as a party can only be validly declared in default after the expiration of the time granted to file an answer.
The respondents’ argument that the petitioners’ subsequent failure to file by February 8 cured the defect was rejected. A declaration of default requires a motion from the plaintiff; no such motion was filed after January 31. The January 31 order was void from its inception. A void order cannot be validated retroactively by a subsequent event like a late filing. Consequently, all proceedings predicated on that void order—the ex parte hearing on February 13 and the decision on February 15—were also nullities. The petitioners were deprived of their right to due process and a day in court without legal basis, warranting correction via certiorari. The case was ordered remanded for proceedings on the merits based on the filed pleadings.