G.R. No. L-18400; November 29, 1962
ALFREDO HILARIO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE HON. MARCIANO D. BAUTISTA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Alfredo Hilario filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac on October 8, 1958, seeking to enjoin the demolition of his irrigation dam. The action stemmed from an administrative decision rendered by Undersecretary of Public Works Marciano D. Bautista on January 11, 1958, in Water Right Case No. 1958-2, initiated by Cesar A. Manganaan. The decision, received by Hilario on March 6, 1958, ordered him to demolish the dam within thirty days, failing which the government would do so at his expense pursuant to Act No. 2152 (the Irrigation Act). Hilario claimed a prescriptive right to the water use and alleged lack of opportunity to present evidence in the administrative case.
Hilario filed a motion for reconsideration of the administrative decision on March 28, 1958. This motion was denied, and he received notice of the denial on September 24, 1958. He then filed his judicial complaint on October 8, 1958, contending it was an appeal from the administrative decision under Section 4 of Act No. 2152 . The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, which the lower court granted, prompting Hilario’s appeal.

ISSUE

The sole legal issue is whether Hilario’s judicial appeal from the administrative decision was filed within the 30-day period prescribed by Section 4 of Act No. 2152 .

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, ruling the appeal was filed out of time. Section 4 of the Irrigation Act provides that the Secretary’s (or Undersecretary’s) decision “shall be final unless appeal therefrom be taken to the proper court within thirty days after the date of the notification of the parties of said decision.” The Court rejected Hilario’s computation that the period should run anew from his receipt of the denial of his motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1958.
The legal logic is that the 30-day appeal period commenced from Hilario’s receipt of the original decision on March 6, 1958. While the filing of his motion for reconsideration on March 28, 1958—22 days later—suspended the running of this period, the period did not start anew upon the denial. Upon receipt of the denial on September 24, 1958, the remaining 8 days of the original 30-day period continued to run. Hilario filed his complaint on October 8, 1958, which was 14 days after September 24. Therefore, the total elapsed time was 22 days (before the motion) plus 14 days (after the denial notice), totaling 36 days from the original notification. This exceeded the 30-day statutory limit, rendering the administrative decision final and unappealable. The Court cited precedents establishing that a motion for reconsideration only suspends the period, which then continues to run upon notice of denial, rather than beginning a fresh period.