G.R. No. L-18365; May 31, 1963
GEORGE DE BISSCHOP, petitioner-appellee, vs. EMILIO L. GALANG, in his capacity as Commissioner of Immigration, respondent-appellant.

FACTS

Petitioner George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was admitted as a prearranged employee for three years until August 1, 1959. He applied for an extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration. The Board of Commissioners denied his application based on confidential reports alleging his company was a gambling front and that he was suspected of tax evasion. He was advised to depart within five days. De Bisschop’s counsel requested a copy of the Board’s formal decision. The Bureau’s legal officer replied that, pursuant to immigration practice, no formal written decision was promulgated when a denial was voted; the denial was merely recorded in the minutes as votes by the individual commissioners. No request for reinvestigation was filed with the Bureau. Instead, de Bisschop filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Manila to prevent his arrest and expulsion, securing a preliminary injunction.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the Board of Commissioners of Immigration is required by law to conduct a formal hearing and to promulgate a written decision when denying an alien’s application for extension of stay.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s order and dismissed the petition for prohibition. The administration of immigration laws is an executive function, and the grant or denial of an extension of stay is purely discretionary. Commonwealth Act No. 613 (The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940) does not prescribe a specific procedure for such applications. The Court upheld the administrative practice of not holding formal hearings or issuing written decisions in these cases for reasons of practicability and expediency. This does not violate due process, as the requirement for de Bisschop to depart was merely a preliminary step, not a final order; deportation proceedings would follow if he did not leave voluntarily. The Court cited Cornejo vs. Gabriel, stating that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings, and due process in this context is not necessarily judicial process. Furthermore, the writ of prohibition was improper. An adequate legal remedy existed through a petition for habeas corpus to test the legality of any confinement should deportation proceedings commence. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ issued only in cases of extreme necessity when no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is available, which was not the situation here. The preliminary injunction was dissolved.