G.R. No. L-18339; June 29, 1962
GODOFREDO NAVERA, petitioner, vs. HON. PERFECTO QUICHO ETC., ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

The Municipality of Ligao filed a petition under Section 112 of Act No. 496 (the Land Registration Act) for the correction of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9304 in the name of Godofredo Navera. The municipality alleged that during the cadastral survey, a portion of Natera Street, measuring 123 square meters, was erroneously included within the technical description of Navera’s Lot No. 2793-A. It prayed for the exclusion of this area from his title. Navera moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Section 112 only permits non-controversial corrections that do not reopen the original decree of registration. He contended that segregating a portion of his titled property would substantially alter the decree issued 23 years prior, which is beyond the scope of a summary proceeding.
The Court of First Instance of Albay denied Navera’s motion to dismiss, holding that the petition was viable under Section 112. The lower court reasoned that a public highway, even if not annotated on a certificate of title, is considered a legal encumbrance that continues to exist under Section 39 of Act No. 496 . It cited the doctrine from Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo that the inclusion of a public highway in a Torrens title does not confer ownership of that highway upon the registered owner. Navera’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file this certiorari petition challenging the lower court’s jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court has jurisdiction to entertain the Municipality’s petition for correction of title under Section 112 of Act No. 496 , given the factual dispute over the identity and status of the 123-square-meter portion.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and set aside the orders of the lower court. The legal logic is anchored on the limited, non-adversarial nature of proceedings under Section 112 of Act No. 496 . While the lower court correctly cited the substantive principle that public highways are excluded from Torrens titles as legal encumbrances even if unannotated, it erred in applying this principle summarily in the face of a factual controversy.
The Court clarified that a Section 112 proceeding is summary in character and may only be used for corrections or amendments where there is unanimity among the parties or no serious adverse claims. It is not a proper remedy for adjudicating contentious issues of fact. In this case, Navera expressly disputed the municipality’s claim that the 123-square-meter area was part of Natera Street and was erroneously included in his survey. This dissent transformed the matter into a controversial issue requiring full-blown adversarial litigation to determine the true facts—specifically, the correct boundary and the legal status of the land in question.
Consequently, the petition effectively sought not a mere clerical correction but a substantive alteration of property rights, which would necessitate reopening the original decree. Such relief cannot be obtained via a summary proceeding under Section 112 when, as here, the central factual allegation is vigorously contested. The proper recourse for the municipality is to institute an ordinary civil action to settle the dispute over ownership and boundaries. Therefore, the lower court acted without jurisdiction in proceeding under Section 112.