G.R. No. L-18316; August 31, 1962
RODOLFO CACHUELA, in his capacity as Acting Mayor of Calinog, Iloilo, petitioner-appellant, vs. NATALIO P. CASTILLO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al., RICARDO PROVIDO, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Petitioner Rodolfo Cachuela, then Vice-Mayor of Calinog, Iloilo, along with five councilors, filed an administrative complaint on July 15, 1960, charging Mayor Ricardo Provido with neglect of duty and maladministration. Acting on this, the Provincial Governor suspended Provido, and the Provincial Board conducted an investigation. On August 30, 1960, the Board, with the Governor concurring, found Provido guilty and ordered a two-month suspension. Provido appealed this decision to the Executive Secretary under Section 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Cachuela initially sought prohibition from the Supreme Court to restrain the Executive Secretary from acting on the appeal, but the petition was dismissed without prejudice. He then filed a similar action in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, arguing that Section 2191 was unconstitutional as it allowed the President, through the Executive Secretary, to review and modify a Provincial Board’s decision, constituting “control” over local governments, which is prohibited by the Constitution. The lower court dismissed Cachuela’s petition, upholding the constitutionality of the appeal mechanism as an exercise of supervisory, not controlling, authority.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the case presents a justiciable controversy requiring a ruling on the constitutionality of Section 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code, which allows an appeal to the Executive Secretary from a Provincial Board’s disciplinary decision against a municipal official.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot and academic. The legal logic is that a court will not decide a case when the act sought to be enjoined has already been consummated, rendering the issue abstract. The records showed that the Executive Secretary had already acted on Provido’s appeal on November 23, 1960, exonerating him. Furthermore, the two-month suspension period imposed by the Provincial Board had already expired on November 6, 1960. Consequently, there was no longer any actual controversy or relief that could be granted through prohibition.
The Court, adhering to the prevailing doctrine of avoiding unnecessary constitutional questions, declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 2191. It emphasized that when a case becomes moot and the constitutional issue is not peremptorily necessary for resolution, judicial restraint is appropriate. The Court also affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Provido’s counterclaim for damages, agreeing that the administrative complaint was a qualified privileged communication and no malice or bad faith was proven. Thus, the appeal was dismissed, and the lower court’s judgment on the counterclaim was affirmed.