G.R. No. L-18127; April 5, 1967
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGES OF NAME OF GERTRUDES JOSEFINA DEL PRADO, THRU HER NATURAL GUARDIAN CORAZON ADOLFO CALDERON, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

FACTS

On July 23, 1959, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Davao by Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, a minor, through her mother and natural guardian Corazon Adolfo Calderon, praying for a change of her name from “Gertrudes Josefina del Prado” to “Gertrudes Josefina Calderon.” The petition alleged that the petitioner was born on March 17, 1956, an illegitimate child from a bigamous marriage between Manuel del Prado and Corazon Adolfo. The surname “Del Prado” was claimed to be a stigma of illegitimacy, causing unfair comments and constituting a handicap in her life and social relations. The petitioner was living with her mother, who was then married to Engineer Romeo C. Calderon, and it was her desire to adopt the surname of her foster father, who was supporting her. The Provincial Fiscal of Davao, representing the Solicitor General, opposed the petition, arguing that as a child born from a bigamous marriage, she had the status of an acknowledged natural child by legal fiction and should bear her father’s surname under the law, and that the change would be prejudicial to her rights from the annulment judgment and other legal rights. After hearing, the lower court granted the petition on July 28, 1960, ordering the name change but stating the order would not deprive the petitioner of her legal status, rights, and obligations. The Solicitor General appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court’s order granting the petition for change of name is based upon “proper and reasonable cause” as required by Section 5 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order, holding that the grant of the petition was based on proper and reasonable cause. The Court found that the petition was clearly for the best interest of the child, considering her foster father’s support and consent, and the aim to eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy associated with her father’s surname. The Court rejected the Solicitor General’s contention that the change aimed to conceal illegitimacy or would sanction a misrepresentation, stating that justice allows a person to improve social standing without prejudice to the State or others. The Court also held that while Article 367 of the Civil Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction shall principally use the father’s surname, it does not prohibit such a child from taking another surname with consent and for justifiable reasons, similar to the allowance for legitimate children. The Court emphasized that a change of name under Rule 103 does not alter one’s legal capacity, civil status, or family rights and duties; it only changes the appellation for convenience. The lower court was found to have exercised its sound discretion judiciously.