GR L 18047; (December, 1963) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-18047, December 26, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF TRINIDAD R. ASENSI. TRINIDAD R. ASENSI, represented by her father, GRACIANO ASENSI, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor.
FACTS
The petitioner, Trinidad R. Asensi, represented by her father Graciano Asensi, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to change her name from Trinidad Rodriguez to Trinidad Asensi. The undisputed facts established at the hearing were that Trinidad is the natural child of Luisa Rodriguez and Graciano Asensi, who were both single at the time of her conception and birth. Subsequently, her parents legally married each other. The father testified that following their marriage, they took the child Trinidad into the fold of their family.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition in the lower court and subsequently appealed the decision granting the name change. The opposition was based on the sole legal contention that a judicial proceeding for a change of name was unnecessary under the circumstances. The Republic argued that, as a legitimated child by virtue of the subsequent marriage of her parents under the Civil Code, Trinidad could automatically adopt the surname of her father without the need for a court order.
ISSUE
Whether a legitimated child must secure a judicial decree to change her surname to that of her father, or whether such a judicial proceeding is superfluous given the automatic legal effect of legitimation.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court granting the petition for a change of name. The Court rejected the Republic’s technical objection, holding that while the legal effect of legitimation under Articles 272 and 264 of the Civil Code indeed allows a child to use the parents’ surname, there is no legal prohibition against seeking judicial confirmation of this right through a change of name proceeding.
The Court clarified that the petition, though it may be considered a superfluity from a strict legal standpoint, is not contrary to law, public policy, customs, or good morals. The judicial proceeding causes no harm or prejudice to any party. The Court emphasized that the appeal constituted a waste of time and judicial resources, as the grant of the petition merely provided formal judicial recognition to a right that the petitioner already possessed by operation of law. Therefore, the lower court’s order was upheld.