G.R. No. L-18008; October 30, 1962
Elisea Laperal, petitioner, vs. Republic of the Philippines, oppositor.

FACTS

Petitioner Elisea Laperal filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Baguio, initially praying to be allowed to “resume using her maiden name.” She alleged she had been legally separated from her husband, Enrique R. Santamaria, by a final partial decision in 1958, and that they had ceased to live together for many years. The City Attorney opposed the petition, citing Article 372 of the Civil Code. The trial court initially denied the petition, holding that Article 372 mandates a wife to continue using her name and surname employed before a decree of legal separation.
Upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court reversed itself. It treated the petition as one for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and granted it. The court reasoned that allowing petitioner, a businesswoman, to continue using her married name would cause confusion in her finances and the liquidation of conjugal assets. The Republic of the Philippines appealed this decision.

ISSUE

Whether a wife who has obtained a decree of legal separation from her husband is entitled to revert to her maiden name, either under Article 372 of the Civil Code or under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, reversed the trial court’s order, and dismissed the petition. The legal logic is anchored on the mandatory and specific language of Article 372 of the Civil Code, which states: “When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.” The Court emphasized that the term “shall” indicates an imperative duty. The rationale is that a decree of legal separation does not sever the marital bond (vinculum); the wife’s married status remains unchanged. The law’s policy is to have the wife’s name continue to reflect that unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.
The Court rejected the application of the general provisions on change of name under Rule 103 to circumvent Article 372. Even if Rule 103 were applied, the sole ground alleged—the fact of legal separation—is insufficient to justify a change of name. To hold otherwise would allow an easy evasion of the specific statutory mandate. The Court also found the trial court’s supplementary rationale—potential confusion in business and liquidation of assets—to be without merit. These grounds were not alleged in the petition, so no evidence was presented. Furthermore, the decree of legal separation itself automatically dissolved and liquidated the conjugal partnership, eliminating any future confusion regarding conjugal assets. Therefore, the petition failed both under the specific Civil Code provision and under the general rules for change of name.