G.R. No. L-17778. November 30, 1962.
JESUS L. CARMELO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Probe Committee, Office of the Mayor of Manila, petitioner-appellant, vs. ARMANDO RAMOS, respondent-appellee.

FACTS

The Mayor of Manila created an investigative committee, chaired by petitioner Jesus L. Carmelo, to probe anomalies involving city license personnel. The committee issued subpoenas to private citizen Armando Ramos, a bookkeeper, requiring his appearance on multiple dates in connection with an administrative case against a city employee. Ramos, despite service, refused to appear. The committee then filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila to have Ramos declared in contempt for obstructing the proceedings. The trial court dismissed the petition.
The lower court held that no law empowers such a mayoral committee to issue subpoenas or administer oaths. It further ruled that compelling Ramos to testify would violate his constitutional right against self-incrimination. This was based on Ramos’s prior statement to city investigators admitting misappropriation of funds intended for tax payments, a fact relevant to the administrative case. Compelling confirmation of this statement could furnish evidence against him in a potential criminal case for estafa.

ISSUE

Whether the investigative committee created by the Mayor of Manila has the power to subpoena witnesses and seek their punishment for contempt for refusal to appear.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding the committee lacked the power to compel witness attendance or seek contempt sanctions. The legal logic proceeds from statutory construction and the non-delegable nature of contempt powers. Petitioner invoked Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, which grants investigative bodies the incidental powers to administer oaths, summon witnesses, and seek contempt sanctions for non-compliance. However, the Court clarified that this provision applies only to entities expressly vested by law with “authority to take testimony or evidence.” The Mayor’s executive order merely granted a general power to investigate; it contained no express grant of authority to take testimony, which is a prerequisite for invoking Section 580.
Furthermore, the Court reiterated its ruling in Francia v. Pecson that while the Mayor has an implied power to investigate city employees to properly exercise his disciplinary authority, this implied power does not include the authority to delegate the specific power to administer oaths and issue compulsory process to a committee. The contempt power is inherently judicial. While administrative bodies can seek judicial enforcement of subpoenas under conditions set by law (like Section 580), the committee here failed to establish the foundational statutory grant of testimonial authority. Consequently, it could not validly invoke the judicial contempt process. The Court thus found no need to resolve the subsidiary issue regarding the right against self-incrimination.