G.R. No. L-17411, L-18681, L-18683 May 19, 1966
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and LUSTEVECO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-CCLU, respondents. / LUSTEVECO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-CCLU, ET AL., petitioners, vs. LUZON STEVEDORING CO., ET AL., respondents. / LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and LUSTEVECO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-CCLU, respondents.

FACTS

The Lusteveco Employees Association-CCLU (LEA) filed a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s decision dated December 31, 1965. The dispute originated from a strike staged by LEA. After a first strike in June 1958, respondent Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LUZON) gave LEA strikers until January 6, 1959, to return to work, but none did. Four strikers were later allowed to return on January 26, 1959. On June 2, 1959, LEA, through its President, offered to return to work “under the status quo as directed by the Court of Industrial Relations in its order of June 21, 1958 without prejudice to whatever the decision of said Court may make on the issues involved in the second strike”. LUZON, in a letter dated June 9, 1959, replied that the offer should be held in abeyance as the legality of the second strike was before the CIR and the Secretary of Labor was conciliating. LEA reiterated its offer on June 12, 1959. Other issues raised in the motion included the reduction of Christmas bonus, the credibility of certain exhibits (A, A-1, A-2) which were notes allegedly found, the reasons for the strike, the necessity of a strike notice, the dismissal of strikers including those with pending criminal cases and active unionists, the legality of a sympathetic strike by the Lusteveco Bulk Oil Union (LBOU), the nature of notices sent by LUZON, the intervention of the Secretary of Labor, and the good faith of LEA in declaring the strike.

ISSUE

The primary issue for reconsideration was whether LEA’s strike was converted from an economic strike to an unfair labor practice strike due to LUZON’s refusal of LEA’s return-to-work offer, thereby making it lawful. Subsidiary issues included the propriety of the Christmas bonus reduction, the credibility of evidence, the correctness of the CIR’s factual findings and legal conclusions regarding the strike’s legality, the dismissals of strikers, and the legality of the sympathetic strike.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
1. LEA’s return-to-work offer was not unconditional. It stipulated a return “as directed by the Court of Industrial Relations in its order of June 21, 1958”, which included payment of strike-duration pay. Therefore, LUZON’s refusal did not constitute unfair labor practice that would convert the strike into a lawful one. The acceptance of the four strikers was not discriminatory as their offer did not impose similar conditions.
2. The reduction of Christmas bonus was justified. The bonus was not included in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and thus not demandable. Even if considered a concession under the Agreement, it was subject to the phrase “whenever practicable”. The Agreement had also expired before the bonus was granted in December 1958.
3. The discrediting of Exhibits A, A-1, and A-2 by the CIR was proper. Whether found on a table or inside a log book accessible to guards, it was improbable for company officials to place such damaging notes there.
4. The Supreme Court had considered all acts complained of by the union as reasons for the strike, not just the suspension of seven security guards.
5. The CIR did consider the over-all attitude of the company, as shown in its discussion of the strike’s factual background.
6. The legality of declaring a strike while causes were pending in the CIR was rendered unnecessary to discuss, as the strike was illegal due to other circumstances.
7. The strike, being an economic one (LUZON not having engaged in unfair labor practice), required a strike notice.
8. The CIR’s finding that violence during the strike was not provoked by LUZON was supported by substantial evidence, and thus the dismissal of strikers with pending criminal cases was not disturbed.
9. The dismissal of 13 LEA members authorized by the CIR was for participation in an illegal strike, not for lawful union activity, and was therefore legal.
10. The sympathetic strike by the LBOU was correctly held illegal as it was in support of LEA’s illegal strike.
11. The notices sent by LUZON were not threats but a publication calling strikers to return to work by a deadline, essentially an offer to accept them back.
12. The intervention of the Secretary of Labor had no relevance to the strike’s legality.
13. The strike could not be deemed against unfair labor practice based on LEA’s “good faith” belief. Good faith does not legalize a strike if based on an unlawful, unjust, or trivial ground as found by the CIR.
14. The CIR’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, not preponderance of evidence, which is not the criterion in such cases.