GR L 17069; (September, 1964) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-17069; September 28, 1964
LIANGA BAY LOGGING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and GENERAL ENTERPRISES INC., respondents.
FACTS
This case originated from Civil Case No. 6030 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The respondent, General Enterprises Inc., secured a writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioner, Lianga Bay Logging Co. Inc., on April 12, 1960. The writ enjoined Lianga Bay from diverting logs produced from its Surigao concession to third parties or for other purposes unless it first complied with its alleged commitment to supply General Enterprises with at least two million board feet of logs. The issuance of the writ was conditioned upon General Enterprises posting a bond of five thousand pesos.
Subsequently, the lower court rendered a decision on the main case in favor of General Enterprises Inc., thereby making the preliminary injunction permanent. Lianga Bay Logging Co. Inc. appealed that main decision to the Supreme Court, where it was docketed as a separate case, G.R. No. L-18487, entitled General Enterprises, Inc. v. Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc.
ISSUE
The sole issue presented in this petition is the propriety of the lower court’s order dated April 12, 1960, which granted the writ of preliminary injunction against Lianga Bay Logging Co. Inc.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as moot and academic. The legal logic is straightforward: the present petition challenges an interlocutory order (the preliminary injunction) that was incidental to the main action for specific performance or breach of contract. The core dispute between the parties was conclusively resolved in the companion case, G.R. No. L-18487, wherein the Supreme Court, on August 31, 1964, affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of General Enterprises Inc. That affirmation validated the permanent injunction, which superseded the preliminary writ.
Consequently, any question regarding the validity of the preliminary order became irrelevant. A judicial determination of its propriety would serve no practical purpose, as the main controversy had already been adjudicated with finality. The Court, adhering to the principle that it does not decide moot cases where no substantial relief can be granted, found no necessity to rule on the merits of the challenged interlocutory order. The petition was therefore dismissed, with no award of costs.