G.R. No. L-16997; April 25, 1962
RAMCAR INCORPORATED, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO GARCIA, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Ramcar Incorporated filed a collection suit against Domingo Garcia in the Municipal Court of Manila to recover P1,610.82 for car repair services rendered. Garcia, in his answer, admitted obtaining the services but denied the obligation was due and demandable, alleging that Ramcar had failed to correct defects in the repair work. The municipal court ruled for Ramcar, and Garcia appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). At the CFI hearing, Garcia’s motion for postponement was denied due to his counsel’s conflicting schedule. The court proceeded to receive Ramcar’s evidence ex parte and rendered judgment, ordering Garcia to pay the principal amount with interest and attorney’s fees. Garcia’s motion for new trial was denied, prompting a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.
Garcia argued that the contract was a lease of work or service under Article 1644 of the Civil Code. He invoked Articles 1715 and 1169, contending that Ramcar, as contractor, had the obligation to execute the work without defects. He asserted that since the principal issue raised by the pleadings was the defective nature of the repairs, the burden of proof (onus probandi) lay with Ramcar to establish that the repairs were not defective. Garcia claimed that Ramcar, having only proved the allegations in its complaint without addressing the defect issue, failed to discharge this burden, rendering his obligation not yet due and demandable.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the burden of proving that the car repairs were defective lies with the defendant-debtor (Garcia) as an affirmative defense, or with the plaintiff-creditor (Ramcar) as part of its cause of action.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the CFI decision, ruling that the burden of proving the alleged defects in the repair work rested on Garcia. The Court clarified that in a civil case, the plaintiff is only required to prove the material allegations constituting its cause of action. Here, Ramcar’s cause of action was the prestation of repair services and Garcia’s correlative obligation to pay. Ramcar successfully proved these allegations through ex parte presentation of evidence.
The Court held that Garcia’s allegation of defective repairs was an affirmative defense. Under procedural rules, a party alleging an affirmative defense must establish it by preponderant evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of an issue. By asserting the existence of defects, Garcia assumed the burden of proving that fact. His failure to appear at trial and present any evidence was fatal to his defense. The legal presumption under the Rules of Court is that official duty, including the contractor’s duty, has been regularly performed. In the absence of contrary proof, the repair services were deemed satisfactory. Therefore, Articles 1715 and 1169 of the Civil Code, which govern reciprocal obligations and warranty against defects, could not be invoked by Garcia absent the requisite proof of defects. The lower court’s factual findings, being conclusive due to Garcia’s default, supported the judgment.