G.R. No. L-16970; January 30, 1962
HON. ELOY B. BELLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and EUSEBIO E. FERRER, petitioners, vs. VALENTIN A. FERNANDO, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Eusebio E. Ferrer filed a damages suit against respondent Valentin A. Fernando in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The trial court rendered a summary judgment on April 28, 1959. Fernando filed a motion for reconsideration on May 22, 1959, which was denied on June 17, 1959, with notice served on June 24, 1959. On that same day, with six days remaining in his 30-day appeal period, Fernando filed a notice of appeal and a motion for a 30-day extension to file his record on appeal and appeal bond, citing his counsel’s heavy workload.
The trial court denied the extension motion on June 26, 1959, but Fernando received the denial order only on July 1, 1959, one day after his appeal period had expired. He nonetheless filed his record on appeal and bond on July 8, 1959. The trial court disapproved these for being filed out of time, declaring its judgment final. Fernando then petitioned the Court of Appeals for certiorari, which nullified the trial court’s orders and directed that his appeal be given due course. Ferrer appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Did the Court of Appeals err in ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in disapproving Fernando’s appeal for being filed out of time?

RULING

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred. The Supreme Court reversed its decision and reinstated the trial court’s orders denying the appeal. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a natural right, and must be exercised strictly according to procedural law. Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that the notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal be filed within the 30-day reglementary period. Compliance is jurisdictional; failure renders the judgment final and executory.
Fernando’s record on appeal and bond were indisputably filed late. Critically, a motion for extension of time to file these documents does not suspend the running of the appeal period. The movant cannot assume the motion will be granted and must ascertain its status to perfect the appeal within the remaining period. Fernando, aware of the urgency, failed to verify the court’s action on his motion before his period lapsed. His reliance on court officials to promptly serve the denial order was unjustified; the duty to monitor the motion’s status rested on him. His further delay of seven days after receiving the denial order before filing the documents underscored his lack of diligence.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the extension. Fernando’s plea of “pressure of work from other cases” is not a compelling reason, as the 30-day rule already accounts for counsel’s ordinary professional demands. The few pleadings involved and the simple act of depositing a cash bond or mailing it from Bulacan to Pangasinan could have been accomplished within the six days he had left when he filed his motion. Extensions are granted only for justifiable reasons like fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, none of which were present here. Therefore, the trial court correctly declared its judgment final.