G.R. No. L-16815; July 24, 1961
ARSENIO L. CANLAS AND ADENA GONZALES-CANLAS, petitioners, vs. HON. BERNABE DE AQUINO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac and JAIME TAYAG, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners, doctors of medicine, were constructing a house in Concepcion, Tarlac, to establish a private hospital. They had secured the necessary permits and had already opened a medical clinic on the premises. Respondent Jaime Tayag later obtained a permit to construct a ricemill directly across the street from the clinic. The municipal health officer, citing a local ordinance requiring a sanitary permit for establishments that may cause a nuisance, revoked Tayag’s permit, finding the ricemill’s operation incompatible with the nearby medical facility.
Petitioners filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 3512) in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, alleging that the ricemill’s operation would emit smoke, dust, and noise, creating an environment detrimental to hospital patients and risking the revocation of their hospital permit by the Bureau of Hospitals. They sought a preliminary injunction to halt the ricemill’s construction. The court, under Judge Zoilo Hilario, granted the injunction. Respondent Tayag later filed an unverified motion to dissolve the injunction, claiming petitioners could be fully compensated for damages and offering to post a bond.

ISSUE

Did respondent Judge Bernabe de Aquino commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction?

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and annulled the order dissolving the injunction. The ruling was based on several legal errors. First, Tayag’s motion for dissolution was unverified and merely contained abstract conclusions without specific factual support, contrary to the requirements under Rule 60, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. The respondent judge accepted these conclusions without requiring any supporting evidence or affidavit.
Second, the judge gravely abused his discretion by relying on private, unverified “reliable information” that modern ricemills could operate without being a nuisance, and by expressing an intention to inspect the mill after construction and enjoin its operation only if it proved problematic. This reasoning was fundamentally flawed. Allowing construction to proceed would render the main action for prohibition moot, as the injury sought to be prevented—the establishment of a nuisance—would have already occurred. The potential harm to the hospital’s operation, its patients, and public health was irreparable and not fully compensable by damages. Exposing Tayag to greater potential loss by allowing construction to continue, only to possibly halt operations later, was an error in judgment constituting grave abuse of discretion. The preliminary injunction should have been maintained to preserve the status quo pending final adjudication of the case.