GR L 16509; (April, 1961) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-16509. April 29, 1961.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO TAN, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch III, FRANCISCO T. KOH, VICENTE VILLANUEVA, SANTOS LLORCA, ELOY T. KOH, DOLORES SIY HAI PIN, JOSE UY ENG KUI alias JOSE VILLANUEVA UY, PROCOPIO ELEAZAR and VICENTE ALUNAN, respondents.
FACTS
The prosecution in Criminal Case No. 36042 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, involving charges for violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 85 against the private respondents, filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court. The petition sought to enjoin respondent Judge Bienvenido Tan from proceeding with the trial of the criminal case. This request was grounded on the prosecution’s motion for inhibition, which had been denied by Judge Tan.
The prosecution’s motion for inhibition was based on the allegation that Judge Tan had previously presided over and rendered a decision in a related civil case, Civil Case No. 24248, entitled “Rehabilitation Finance Corporation vs. Villanueva Steamship Co., Inc., et al.” The subject matter of this civil litigation involved the same transactions that formed the basis of the criminal charges. Since that civil decision was pending review before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-15512, the prosecution argued that Judge Tan had already formed a preconceived opinion on the merits of the factual issues central to the criminal case, thereby compromising his impartiality.
ISSUE
Whether the petition for prohibition to compel Judge Tan’s inhibition from the criminal case, on grounds of prejudgment, has become moot and academic.
RULING
Yes, the petition is dismissed for being moot and academic. The Supreme Court, in its resolution, noted that a writ of preliminary injunction had been issued at the start of the proceedings to restrain Judge Tan from trying the criminal case. However, during the pendency of this petition, a supervening event occurred: respondent Judge Bienvenido Tan had retired from the judiciary. This retirement rendered the core issue of the case—whether Judge Tan should be prohibited from hearing the case due to alleged bias—entirely academic.
The legal principle applied is that courts will not determine a moot case, as a judicial pronouncement on such a matter would have no practical legal effect. A case becomes moot when there is no longer any actual controversy between the parties or when the issues have ceased to exist. Here, with Judge Tan’s retirement, he was no longer in a position to preside over the criminal case in any capacity. Therefore, the relief sought by the petitioner—to enjoin him from trying the case—could no longer be granted, and any ruling on the substantive merits of the inhibition argument would be an advisory opinion. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the case without making any pronouncement on the underlying legal question of prejudgment or the propriety of judicial inhibition, and without awarding costs.
