G.R. No. L-16474; January 31, 1962
Tomas B. Tadeo, petitioner-appellant, vs. The Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, The Justice of the Peace of Mangaldan, Emilia Acosta and Leoncio Maicong, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Petitioner-appellant Tomas B. Tadeo, a lawyer and notary public, sought a writ of prohibition from the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan to enjoin the Provincial Fiscal and the Justice of the Peace Court of Mangaldan from conducting a preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 263 for estafa. The criminal complaint was filed by spouses Leoncio Maicong and Emilia Acosta (appellees), alleging Tadeo fraudulently prepared a deed of sale of their land instead of a partition document. Tadeo argued this prosecution was barred and an abuse of discretion.
Tadeo’s petition was based on a history of litigation between the parties. The appellees had previously filed a civil action for damages (Civil Case No. 10759) and an initial estafa complaint (Criminal Case No. 129), both arising from the same transaction. The civil case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance, and subsequently, the Justice of the Peace Court dismissed the criminal case, citing the civil dismissal as prejudicial. After these dismissals, Tadeo himself filed a new civil action for declaratory relief (Civil Case No. D-413) concerning the same transaction. It was during the pendency of this case that the appellees filed the new estafa complaint (Criminal Case No. 263). Tadeo contended that the prior dismissals constituted a bar to this new prosecution and that the pending declaratory relief case was prejudicial to it.

ISSUE

Whether the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion in conducting the preliminary investigation for Criminal Case No. 263, thereby entitling Tadeo to the extraordinary remedy of prohibition.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the lower court’s order. The legal logic is twofold. First, the previous dismissals did not constitute a bar to the new criminal prosecution. The dismissal of the initial civil case (No. 10759) was for lack of interest, not an adjudication on the merits of the fraud allegation. The dismissal of the first criminal case (No. 129) was explicitly without prejudice, leaving the fiscal free to reinvestigate. Second, the pending civil action for declaratory relief (No. D-413) filed by Tadeo himself does not pose a prejudicial question that would suspend the criminal case. A prejudicial question exists when a civil action involves an issue intimately related to the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case, and the resolution of that issue determines the criminal action. The Court found Tadeo’s declaratory relief action improper, as he was not a privy to the deed in question but merely the notary public, and thus no rights or duties of his needed judicial declaration. Consequently, no such intimately related issue existed.
Furthermore, the Court held that prohibition was not the appropriate remedy because Tadeo had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. He could raise all his defenses during the preliminary investigation and the subsequent trial, if any, and appeal from any adverse judgment. The act of the fiscal in conducting the investigation was a legitimate exercise of duty to ascertain if a crime was committed, not a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The writ of prohibition is reserved for correcting acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, not for correcting possible errors in judgment where other remedies are available.