G.R. No. L-16196; May 30, 1961
ROMAN LICUP, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Roman Licup, a former Chief of Police for the Manila Railroad Company (MRR), filed his first action (Civil Case No. 31161) in 1956. He sought mandamus to compel the MRR and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to retire him under Republic Act No. 660 (the Retirement Law). His claim was predicated on his assertion that his 1951 separation from MRR was a consequence of the government reorganization under Republic Act No. 422 . The trial court dismissed this petition in 1957, finding that an annex to his own petition (Annex “B”) demonstrated his separation was not due to the said reorganization. The court explicitly held he was “not entitled to the retirement asked for” and dismissed the case “for lack of merits.” Licup did not appeal this dismissal.
Over two years later, in 1959, Licup filed a second complaint (Civil Case No. 41210) against the same defendants. He alleged substantially the same facts and sought the same primary relief—retirement under R.A. No. 660 —albeit with a higher claim for damages. The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, which the trial court granted. Licup appealed, contending the first dismissal was not a judgment on the merits and that there was no identity of causes of action.

ISSUE

Whether the doctrine of res judicata bars the second complaint filed by Roman Licup.

RULING

Yes, the second action is barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding all elements of res judicata are present. There is identity of parties (Licup vs. MRR and GSIS), identity of subject matter (Licup’s claim for retirement benefits under R.A. No. 660 ), and identity of causes of action (his asserted right to retire based on separation due to the R.A. No. 422 reorganization).
The Court rejected Licup’s argument that the first dismissal was not on the merits. Under Rule 30, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, a dismissal not provided for in that rule, and not for lack of jurisdiction, operates as an adjudication on the merits. The 1957 order was a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, which falls under this rule. More critically, the Court examined the substance of the first order. The trial court had conclusively ruled on the very right Licup invoked, finding from his own annex that his separation was not reorganization-based and thus he had “no such right.” This constituted a definitive adjudication on the merits of his claim. His failure to appeal rendered that judgment final and conclusive. The Court cited De Guzman v. Ramoso to illustrate that even a dismissal order can constitute a bar if it adjudicates the parties’ rights. Therefore, Licup’s attempt to relitigate the same claim is precluded.