G.R. No. L-16084 November 30, 1962
JOHN O. YU, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAXIMO DE LARA, JUAN PANLILIO, LUCIA RIVERO, FLORENTINO ROQUE and DOMINGO SAMSON, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

The disputed property is a registered lot in Caloocan. It was originally registered in 1916, later acquired by Philippine Realty Corporation, and subsequently sold to the plaintiff-appellee, John O. Yu, a Filipino citizen, in 1956. In 1945, several persons settled on the property and built houses without the owner’s permission. Between 1947 and 1952, the defendants-appellants purchased these houses from the original settlers and continued occupying the land without paying rent to the registered owner.
In February 1957, Yu demanded in writing that the appellants vacate the premises within 30 days. Upon their refusal, he filed an unlawful detainer complaint within the one-year statutory period. The Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan decided in favor of Yu, and the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on appeal, affirmed the decision, ordering the appellants to vacate, pay accrued rentals, and bear the costs.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) whether the registered owner lost possession by abandonment; (2) whether the action for unlawful detainer was proper; and (3) whether the Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction due to a pending prejudicial question on appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment. On the first issue, the Court held that abandonment under Article 555 of the Civil Code requires both physical relinquishment and a clear intention not to reclaim ownership. The registered owner’s mere inaction in failing to immediately sue the occupants does not constitute such abandonment. More fundamentally, the doctrine of abandonment cannot apply to registered land, as no title in derogation of the registered owner can be acquired by prescription or adverse possession under Section 46 of Act No. 496 (the Land Registration Act). The appellants, having purchased only the houses and occupied the land without any agreement with or payment to the owner, were mere squatters whose possession was merely tolerated and did not affect the owner’s title or possession.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that a person occupying land at the owner’s tolerance, without any contract, is bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand. The failure to vacate after such demand makes the possession unlawful, justifying an ejectment action under Rule 72. Even assuming a potential jurisdictional defect in the justice of the peace court, the appellants did not raise this objection therein. Consequently, the Court of First Instance could validly take cognizance of the case on appeal, exercising its original jurisdiction over an action for recovery of possession under Rule 40.
On the third issue, the Court found no prejudicial question. The pending appeals (G.R. Nos. L-12614 and L-12615) involved the propriety of registering the appellants’ adverse claim, which the Land Registration Commissioner had already resolved against them. This issue was not prejudicial to the possessory action, as it did not affect the owner’s right to possess his property. Moreover, those related cases had already been decided by the Supreme Court, upholding the Commissioner’s action. Therefore, the Court of First Instance correctly exercised its jurisdiction.