G.R. No. L-16071, April 29, 1961
RUFINO O. ABUDA, petitioner, vs. AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Rufino O. Abuda was the Justice of the Peace of General MacArthur and Quinapundan, Samar. On July 28, 1952, he was convicted of libel by the Court of First Instance of Samar and fined. Following this conviction, the President indefinitely suspended him from office via an administrative order dated November 3, 1952. The Court of First Instance of Samar also suspended him from the practice of law, although the Supreme Court later lifted this suspension, finding the libel did not constitute gross misconduct or involve moral turpitude.
Abuda sought reinstatement and an absolute pardon, which were denied. He eventually tendered his resignation in January 1955 but withdrew it after agreeing to an administrative investigation. The investigating judge, Fidel Fernandez, recommended exoneration, finding the libel conviction insufficient for suspension. On March 6, 1956, President Magsaysay ordered Abuda’s reinstatement but explicitly denied payment of his salary for the suspension period, stating the conviction reflected on his fitness and the suspension itself was sufficient punishment.

ISSUE

Whether petitioner Rufino O. Abuda is entitled to recover his back salaries for the period of his suspension from office.

RULING

No, the petitioner is not entitled to back salaries. The Court ruled that the applicable law is Section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code. The first paragraph governs suspensions by bureau chiefs, generally mandating salary payment upon reinstatement or exoneration unless otherwise ordered. Crucially, the second paragraph specifically addresses suspensions by the President, stating that “no salary shall be paid during suspension unless so provided in the order of suspension; but upon subsequent reinstatement… any salary so withheld may be paid in whole or in part, at the discretion of the officer by whom the suspension was effected.”
The Court held that Abuda’s case falls under this second paragraph, making the payment of withheld salary discretionary upon the President. President Magsaysay, in Administrative Order No. 182, exercised this discretion by ordering reinstatement without back pay, explicitly characterizing the suspension without salary as the imposed punishment. The Supreme Court emphasized it cannot substitute its own discretion for that of the President when the law clearly grants such prerogative. The Court further noted that Abuda’s challenge to the legality of his suspension was barred by laches due to his prolonged delay in seeking judicial relief. The subsequent Republic Act No. 2260 , which contained more favorable provisions on suspension pay, was inapplicable as it took effect in 1959, long after the relevant events. The decision of the Auditor General denying the claim was affirmed.