GR L 16036; (February, 1963) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-16036; February 28, 1963
FLORENTINA UMENGAN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ATTY. REMIGIO BUTACAN, respondent-appellee, MANUEL G. MANZANO and RAMONA S. PABLO, respondents-appellants.
FACTS
Plaintiff Florentina Umengan and her half-sister, Angeles Umengan, were heirs to homestead lands originally applied for by their father, Severino Umengan. Following a partition judgment between them, Florentina was ordered to pay damages to Angeles. For non-payment, Florentina’s shares in the homestead properties were levied and sold at public auction on February 22, 1958, with Angeles as the sole bidder. Subsequently, on June 3, 1958, Angeles sold these acquired shares to Ramona S. Pablo. Separately, on June 11, 1958, Angeles sold her own original shares to Mario S. Pablo. Florentina then filed an action seeking a judicial declaration of her right to repurchase all these sold properties within a five-year period under Section 119 of the Public Land Act ( Commonwealth Act No. 141 ), arguing this right applied to both the execution sale and the subsequent voluntary sales.
The trial court ruled partially in Florentina’s favor. It ordered Ramona S. Pablo to resell to Florentina the shares acquired from the execution sale, effectively recognizing a right of redemption, but dismissed the complaint regarding the sale of Angeles’s own shares to Mario Pablo. Both Florentina and the defendants Manuel Manzano (attorney-in-fact for Angeles) and Ramona Pablo appealed, leading to this review.
ISSUE
The primary issues were: (1) whether the five-year redemption period under the Public Land Act applies to an involuntary sale on execution of homestead land, and (2) whether Florentina, as a co-heir, could redeem the shares that Angeles voluntarily sold from her own allotted portion.
RULING
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment with modification. On the first issue, the Court held that the five-year redemption period under Section 119 of the Public Land Act applies to both voluntary and involuntary sales of homestead land. The law does not distinguish between the two, and the protective policy for homesteaders and their heirs—to afford them ample time to repurchase and retain their family land—applies with equal force to execution sales. This aligns with the precedent set in Cassion v. Philippine National Bank. Therefore, Florentina had a five-year period from February 22, 1958, to redeem the shares sold at auction and subsequently conveyed to Ramona Pablo.
However, the Court modified the trial court’s order for Ramona Pablo to execute a deed of resale within 20 days. It clarified that redemption must be effected by Florentina’s payment of the redemption price within that 20-day period from the judgment’s finality, a practical adjustment given the imminent expiration of the original five-year term.
On the second issue, the Court affirmed the dismissal concerning the sale of Angeles’s own shares to Mario Pablo. Section 119 of the Public Land Act did not apply because Angeles, the homesteader’s heir, was still alive; the right to repurchase under that law belonged to her, not to Florentina. Florentina’s alternative claim under the Civil Code provisions on legal redemption among co-heirs or co-owners also failed. The properties had already been partitioned, terminating the co-ownership. Even if a co-ownership existed, the redemption period would be only thirty days, which had lapsed. Thus, Florentina had no right to redeem the shares Angeles sold from her own patrimony.
