G.R. No. L-16003; March 29, 1961
CESAREO PEREZ and MAMERTA ALCANTARA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. VICENTE EVITE and SUSANA MANIGBAS, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Plaintiffs-appellants Cesareo Perez and Mamerta Alcantara filed an action to quiet title against defendants-appellees Vicente Evite and Susana Manigbas over a parcel of land. The Court of First Instance of Batangas dismissed the complaint and declared the defendants as the owners of the disputed property. This decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals and became final. Upon the defendants’ application, the trial court issued a writ of execution commanding the sheriff to deliver ownership and possession of the land to the defendants.
The plaintiffs moved to quash the writ, arguing that the final decision merely declared ownership in favor of the defendants but did not expressly order the delivery of possession. They contended that a declaration of ownership does not automatically include the right to possession, citing previous Supreme Court rulings. The trial court denied their motion and subsequent motions for clarification. It later issued an order allowing the defendants to fence the property, warning that any interference by the plaintiffs would be considered contempt.

ISSUE

Whether the final judgment declaring the defendants as owners of the land necessarily includes the right to its possession, thereby justifying the writ of execution for delivery of possession and the ancillary order permitting the fencing of the property.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s orders, holding that the delivery of possession is a necessary incident included in the final judgment declaring ownership. The Court distinguished the general principle cited by the appellants from the specific circumstances of this case. While it is true that ownership is distinct from possession, and a declaratory judgment does not always compel surrender of possession—such as when the possessor holds a separate right like a lease—this exception does not apply here.
The trial court found as a fact that the plaintiffs-appellants “have not given any reason why they are retaining the possession of the property.” Since this appeal was taken directly on a pure question of law, this factual finding is conclusive. The appellants’ claim to possession was based solely on their claim of ownership, which was definitively rejected by the final judgment. Consequently, they retained no independent right to remain on the property.
Under Section 45 of Rule 39, a judgment includes not only what is expressly stated but also all matters necessarily included therein or necessary to its enforcement. Following the logic in land registration cases where a writ of demolition is considered ancillary to a writ of possession, the Court ruled that requiring the successful party to institute a separate action to obtain possession would be contrary to justice. It would foster multiplicity of suits, cause unnecessary delay and expense, and defeat the very purpose of the adjudication. Therefore, the orders for execution and fencing, aimed at effectuating the defendants’ complete right as adjudged owners, were valid and legal.