G.R. No. L-15982; May 31, 1963
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES AGENTS, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondent-appellee.

FACTS

Petitioner Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. was denounced before the Port and Harbor Board for constructing a causeway near the mouth of Calat-an Creek in Sipalay, Negros Occidental. Following an investigation, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications rendered a decision on January 16, 1959, ordering the petitioner to remove the causeway and restore the riverbed within thirty days, under threat of government removal at petitioner’s expense. The Secretary’s action was based on Republic Act No. 2056 , which authorizes such orders against encroachments on public navigable waters.
Without appealing this administrative decision to the President, the petitioner directly filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking to annul the Secretary’s order. The lower court dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action, holding that the petitioner failed to exhaust the available administrative remedy of an appeal to the President before seeking judicial intervention.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner was required to exhaust the administrative remedy of appealing to the President from the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications before it could seek judicial relief via certiorari.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s dismissal, holding that exhaustion of the administrative appeal to the President was not a prerequisite in this case. The legal logic rests on the interpretation of Republic Act No. 2056 and the principle of effective and expeditious remedy. The statute prescribes peremptory and short periods: (1) a maximum of 30 days for the party to comply with the removal order, (2) 10 days thereafter for the Secretary to effect removal if uncomplied with, and (3) 90 days for the Secretary to terminate the investigation. Crucially, failure to comply with the Secretary’s order is punishable as a criminal offense. The law contains no express provision for an appeal to the President.
The Court reasoned that the absence of such a statutory appeal provision, combined with the law’s stringent and immediate deadlines, indicates a legislative intent for an expeditious process. An appeal to the President would not be “sufficiently effective, adequate and expeditious” because it would inherently cause delay, potentially allowing the very obstructions the law seeks to swiftly remove to persist, and could expose the petitioner to criminal liability during the pendency of the appeal. Furthermore, the Court cited the doctrine that the action of a Department Secretary, as an alter-ego of the President, bears the President’s implied sanction unless expressly disapproved. Thus, a direct resort to the courts was justified. The case was remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits.