GR L 15870; (December, 1919) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-15870, December 3, 1919
VISAYAN REFINING COMPANY, DEAN C. WORCESTER, and FRED A. LEAS, petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL CAMUS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal and HON. QUINTIN PAREDES, Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands, respondents.
FACTS:
On September 13, 1919, the Governor-General directed the Attorney-General to initiate condemnation proceedings to expropriate a tract of land known as the site of Camp Tomas Claudio in Parañaque, Rizal, for military and aviation purposes. The complaint was filed on September 15, 1919, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, naming as defendants the owners of portions of the property, including petitioners Visayan Refining Company, Dean C. Worcester, and Fred A. Leas. The court provisionally fixed the property’s value at P600,000 and ordered the government to be placed in immediate possession upon deposit of that amount with the provincial treasurer. Petitioners demurred and moved to revoke the order, arguing that there was no legislative authority for the expropriation and that the deposit was made without legal authority, as the funds came from unexpended balances of appropriations for the Militia Commission. The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied the motion. Petitioners then filed this original action with the Supreme Court, seeking a writ of certiorari or prohibition to halt the condemnation proceedings.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Government of the Philippine Islands, through the Governor-General, has the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain to expropriate private property for military and aviation purposes without a specific act of the Philippine Legislature.
2. Whether the provisional deposit of compensation using funds from appropriations for the Militia Commission violates constitutional provisions governing the disbursement of public funds.
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the validity of the condemnation proceedings.
1. Authority to Exercise Eminent Domain: The power of eminent domain is expressly vested in the Government of the Philippine Islands by Section 63 of the Philippine Bill (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902). This power was validly delegated to the Governor-General under Section 64(h) of the Administrative Code of 1917, which authorizes the Governor-General to determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise eminent domain on behalf of the government. The expropriation for military and aviation purposes constitutes a “public use” under the Constitution. Therefore, no specific act of the Philippine Legislature is required for the Governor-General to initiate such proceedings.
The Court held that the trial court acted in accordance with law, and no constitutional or statutory violations were committed. The writs of certiorari and prohibition were therefore unwarranted.