G.R. No. L-15816; February 29, 1964
EDUARDO E. PASCUAL, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS and SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

Eduardo Pascual filed a petition with the Director of Lands seeking the cancellation of a government lease contract held by Valente Ramos over two lots, citing Ramos’s failure to pay rentals and taxes and to cultivate the land. Following an investigation, the Director of Lands, with the concurrence of the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, ordered the cancellation of Ramos’s lease. However, the Director denied Pascual’s claim for a preferential right of entry to the cancelled lands, reasoning that the lease would have been cancelled administratively even without Pascual’s petition. Pascual’s appeal to the Office of the President was dismissed.
Pascual then filed a certiorari action in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac to annul the decision insofar as it denied him the preferential right. The trial court ruled in his favor, declaring him entitled to the rights under Section 102 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and ordering the Director of Lands to allow him to file an application. The Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources appealed this decision to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether Eduardo Pascual is entitled to a preferential right of entry over the public lands upon the cancellation of the prior lease, pursuant to Section 102 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 .

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and dismissed Pascual’s complaint. The Court held that the preferential right of entry under Section 102 of the Public Land Law is not absolute and does not automatically vest in any person who initiates a successful opposition. The provision applies primarily where there is no prior lawful entry or where the contestant is an actual occupant claiming a right based on prior occupancy or cultivation.
The administrative rulings from the Director of Lands up to the Office of the President correctly interpreted the law. They found that Pascual was a mere stranger or informant who brought the lessee’s delinquency to the government’s attention. The cancellation was based on public records of non-payment, which the Director could have acted upon motu proprio. The actual occupants of the land were Ramos’s tenants, who had cultivated the land since 1919. The policy of the law, as stated in Section 33 of the same Act, is to give priority to actual occupants. The contemporaneous and consistent interpretation by the administrative agencies charged with enforcing the land law deserves great weight and was not shown to be clearly erroneous. Since Pascual was not an occupant, he acquired no preferential right from his petition.